Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and Hospital Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions by Wellington, Katherine Booth
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 30 | Issue 2 Article 1
January 2013
Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and Hospital
Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions
Katherine Booth Wellington
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and Hospital Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 Santa
Clara High Tech. L.J. 139 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol30/iss2/1
BOOTH WELLINGTON 4/2/2014 10:58 PM 
 
139 
CYBERATTACKS ON MEDICAL DEVICES AND 
HOSPITAL NETWORKS: LEGAL GAPS AND 
REGULATORY SOLUTIONS 
Katherine Booth Wellington† 
America must also face the rapidly growing threat from 
cyber-attacks. . . . We cannot look back years from now and 
wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our 
security and our economy. 
—Barack Obama1 
 
Abstract 
Cyberattacks on medical devices and hospital networks are a 
real and growing threat.  Malicious actors have the capability to hack 
pacemakers and insulin pumps, shut down hospital networks, and 
steal personal health information.  This Article analyzes the laws and 
regulations that apply to cyberattacks on medical devices and 
hospital networks and argues that the existing legal structure is 
insufficient to prevent these attacks.  While the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act and the Federal Anti-Tampering Act impose stiff penalties 
for cyberattacks, it is often impossible to identify the actor behind a 
cyberattack—greatly decreasing the deterrent power of these laws. 
Few laws address the role of medical device manufacturers and 
healthcare providers in protecting against cyberattacks. While 
HIPAA incentivizes covered entities to protect personal health 
information, HIPAA does not apply to most medical device 
manufacturers or cover situations where malicious actors cause harm 
without accessing personal health information. Recent FDA draft 
 
 †  J.D., Harvard Law School (2013); B.A., Yale University (2008).  The author is an 
Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, with a focus on healthcare and life sciences law.  This paper 
was written as part of the Petrie-Flom Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics Student 
Fellowship.  The author thanks Professor Benjamin Roin and Professor I. Glenn Cohen for 
helpful comments and advice.  The author also thanks Mikaela Ray and the rest of the editorial 
staff of the journal.  The statements and views expressed in this Article are those of the author, 
do not reflect those of Ropes & Gray, and do not constitute legal advice or legal opinion. 
 1. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, State of the Union Address 
(Feb. 12, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/12/transcript-
obama-state-union-speech). 
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guidance suggests that the agency has begun to impose cybersecurity 
requirements on medical device manufacturers. However, this 
guidance does not provide a detailed roadmap for medical device 
cybersecurity and does not apply to healthcare providers.  Tort law 
may fill in the gaps, although it is unclear if traditional tort principles 
apply to cyberattacks.  New legal and regulatory approaches are 
needed.  One approach is industry self-regulation, which could lead 
to the adoption of industry-wide cybersecurity standards and lay the 
groundwork for future legal and regulatory reform.  A second 
approach is to develop a more forward-looking and flexible FDA 
focus on evolving cybersecurity threats.  A third approach is a 
legislative solution.  Expanding HIPAA to apply to medical device 
manufacturers and to any cyberattack that causes patient harm is one 
way to incentivize medical device manufactures and healthcare 
providers to adopt cybersecurity measures.  All three approaches 
provide a starting point for considering solutions to twenty-first 
century cybersecurity threats. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cyberattacks against medical devices and hospital networks
2
 are 
a real and growing threat.  Iran’s nuclear facilities,3 Google’s servers,4 
U.S. banks,
5
 and Persian Gulf oil and gas companies
6
 have all been 
recent victims of cyberattacks.  As described in Part I, medical 
devices and hospital networks are just as vulnerable.  Researchers 
have demonstrated that it is possible to remotely hack implanted 
insulin pumps and pacemakers—flooding the body with a deadly dose 
of insulin or releasing a heart-stopping electric charge.
7
  Hospital 
network security breaches have “disrupted glucose monitors, canceled 
patient appointments and shut down sleep labs” in hospitals.8  Several 
hospitals have experienced multi-day network outages due to malware 
attacks.
9
  Medical identity theft—one goal of cyberattacks—is an 
increasing problem faced by millions of patients each year.
10
 
The existing legal structure is insufficient to address these 
 
 2. This Article focuses on the problem of cyberattacks on both medical devices and 
hospital networks.  It is unclear if a hospital network is a medical device.  Commentators have 
suggested that the FDA could regulate hospital networks as medical devices under the broad 
definition of “devices” in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act.  The FDA may be moving in this 
direction.  See, e.g., Lucas Mearian, FDA Eyes Regulation of Wireless Networks at Clinics, 
Hospitals, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 10, 2011, 6:01 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9203761/FDA_eyes_regulation_of_wireless_networks
_at_clinics_hospitals?taxonomyId=132&pageNumber=1. 
 3. Iran Nuclear Facilities Hit by Cyber Attack that Plays AC/DC’s Thunderstruck at 
Full Volume, MAIL ONLINE (July 25, 2012, 8:43 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2178781/Iran-nuclear-facilities-hit-cyber-attack-plays-AC-DCs-Thunderstruck-volume.html. 
 4. Nicole Perlroth, Google Warns of New State-Sponsored Cyberattack Targets, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/google-warns-new-
state-sponsored-cyberattack-targets. 
 5. Lee Ferran, Iran Denies Cyber Attacks on US Banks, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/iran-denies-cyber-attacks-us-banks/story?id=18191088. 
 6. Lolita C. Baldor, US: Hackers in Iran Responsible for Cyberattacks, NBC NEWS 
(Oct. 12, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/us-hackers-iran-
responsible-cyberattacks-1C6423908. 
 7. Christine Hsu, Many Popular Medical Devices May Be Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks, 
MEDICAL DAILY (Apr. 10, 2012, 1:34 PM), 
http://www.medicaldaily.com/news/20120410/9486/medical-implants-pacemaker-hackers-
cyber-attack-fda.htm. 
 8. Susan D. Hall, Hospital Medical Devices Riddled with Malware, FIERCEHEALTHIT 
(Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/hospital-medical-devices-riddled-
malware/2012-10-18. 
 9. Bat Blue KOs Malware in the First Round!, BAT BLUE NETWORKS, 
http://www.batblue.com/page.php?55 (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 10. Taylor Armerding, Ransom, Implant Attack Highlight Need for Healthcare Security, 
CSO (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.csoonline.com/article/725880/ransom-implant-attack-highlight-
need-for-healthcare-security. 
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threats.  As described in Parts II and III, federal and state legal 
regimes focus primarily on punishing the malicious actors behind 
cyberattacks.  However, these actors are extremely hard to identify 
and often difficult to prosecute, undercutting the deterrence effects of 
these regimes.  While the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
the power to regulate the cybersecurity of medical devices and 
hospital networks, it has only begun to do so through non-binding 
draft guidance issued in 2013.
11
  The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) comes the closest to addressing 
the problem of cyberattacks by requiring healthcare providers to 
protect patient health information (PHI) on hospital networks.
12
 
However, HIPAA does not apply to most medical device 
manufacturers or address scenarios where a cyberattack does not 
breach PHI. 
Given the difficulty of identifying and deterring the malicious 
actors behind cyberattacks, new approaches are needed to address the 
threat of these attacks.  Part IV describes three potential approaches.  
The first approach is industry self-regulation, which could lead to the 
adoption of industrywide cybersecurity standards and lay the 
groundwork for future legal and regulatory reform.  The second 
approach is to shift the FDA’s focus from backward-looking adverse 
event reporting to forward-looking identification of cybersecurity 
risks.  The regulation of aircraft safety by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) provides a model for a flexible approach to 
addressing and mitigating new threats.  The third approach is to adopt 
a legislative solution to incentivize medical device manufacturers and 
healthcare providers to adopt security features.  Expanding HIPAA to 
apply to medical device manufacturers and to any type of cyberattack 
is one potential legislative solution.  
This Article makes three contributions.  First, it analyzes the 
current legal framework that applies to cyberattacks on medical 
devices and hospital networks.  To date, there has not been an 
overarching survey of this kind in the academic literature.  Second, it 
identifies gaps in the statutory and regulatory framework that make 
 
 11. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS 
FOR MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2013) [hereinafter CONTENT OF 
PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocu
ments/UCM356190.pdf. 
 12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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this framework insufficient to address the growing threat of 
cyberattacks.  Finally, it presents three different approaches to 
addressing the threat of cyberattacks on medical devices and hospital 
networks. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE THREAT 
Cyberattacks may impact individual medical devices or entire 
hospital networks.  Security flaws may permit cyberattacks against 
individual medical devices, potentially harming the patient relying on 
the medical device.  This could be the result of a malicious attack 
against an individual patient or simply a computer virus that happens 
to infiltrate the medical device.  Security flaws may also lead to 
cyberattacks against entire hospital networks, resulting in widespread 
network outages and “impacting a hospital’s ability to treat patients or 
relay critical information.”13  Security flaws may also permit the theft 
of patient medical data contained either on medical devices or 
hospital networks, “lead[ing] to fraudulent claims by the criminal 
entity to the patient’s insurance company or . . . involv[ing] dishonest 
pharmacists that wire fraudulent prescriptions that are eventually sold 
on the black market.”14  All of these are serious threats to patient 
safety and privacy. 
There are three primary types of cyberattacks: unauthorized 
access, malware, and a denial-of-service or distributed-denial-of-
service (DDoS) attack.
15
  Unauthorized access to a medical device 
involves “a malicious actor intercepting and altering signals sent 
wirelessly to the medical device.”16  Medical devices such as 
pacemakers, neurostimulators, defibrillators, and drug pumps “use 
embedded computers and radios to monitor chronic disorders and 
 
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NAT’L CYBERSECURITY & COMMC’NS INTEGRATION 
CTR., ATTACK SURFACE: HEALTHCARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR 3 (2012) [hereinafter 
ATTACK SURFACE], available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-MedicalDevices.pdf. 
 14. Id. at 5. 
 15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-816, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA 
SHOULD EXPAND ITS CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF 
DEVICES 15 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647767.pdf.  “A ‘denial-of-
service’ attack is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users of 
a service from using that service.  Examples include attempts to ‘flood’ a network, thereby 
preventing legitimate network traffic; attempts to disrupt connections between two machines, 
thereby preventing access to service; attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a 
service; [or] attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person.”  Denial of Service 
Attacks, CARNEGIE MELLON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, 
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/denial_of_service.html (last updated June 4, 2001). 
 16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15. 
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treat patients with automatic therapies.”17  These computers and 
radios use electronic signals to communicate with devices outside of 
the body, creating an opportunity for a malicious actor to intercept the 
signals and disrupt the functioning of the medical device.
18
 
Malware “is a malicious software program designed to carry out 
annoying or harmful actions.”19  The susceptibility of a medical 
device or hospital network to malware depends on the software 
involved; some types of software are susceptible to malware, while 
others are not.
20
  As medical device manufacturers and hospital 
networks increasingly rely on off-the-shelf software, the threat of 
malware increases.
21
  A DDoS attack often involves a computer worm 
or virus that “overwhelm[s] a device by excessive communication 
attempts, making the device unusable by either slowing or blocking 
functionality or draining the device’s battery.”22  DDoS attacks may 
also occur against hospital networks. All three types of attacks may 
disrupt the functioning of the medical device or network, potentially 
harming patients. 
A. Cyberattacks on Individual Medical Devices 
The Homeland episode aside,
23
 there have been no documented 
incidents of a patient suffering harm from an attack on a medical 
device.  As one government panel discussion revealed, however, 
medical devices in hospitals are “riddled” with malware, which can 
“clog patient-monitoring equipment and other software systems, at 
times rendering the devices temporarily inoperable.”24  According to 
McAfee, a security company, “[m]edical devices, such as diagnostic 
 
 17. Daniel Halperin et al., Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software 
Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses, 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SEC. & PRIVACY 129. 
 18. Id. 
 19. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Martha Vockley, Safe and Secure? Healthcare in the Cyberworld, BIOMEDICAL 
INSTRUMENTATION & TECH., May-June 2012, at 165-66, available at 
http://www.aami.org/publications/bit/2012/Healthcare_Cybersecurity_BIT_MayJune2012.pdf. 
 22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15. 
 23. Tarun Wadhwa, Yes, You Can Hack a Pacemaker (and Other Medical Devices Too), 
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/12/06/yes-you-
can-hack-a-pacemaker-and-other-medical-devices-too (“On Sunday’s episode of the Emmy 
award-winning show Homeland, the Vice President of the United States is assassinated by a 
group of terrorists that have hacked into the pacemaker controlling his heart.”). 
 24. David Talbot, Computer Viruses are “Rampant” on Medical Devices in Hospitals, 
MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429616/computer-viruses-are-rampant-on-medical-
devices-in-hospitals. 
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tablet computers, heart rate monitors, and MRI scanners, are just as 
susceptible to malware as standard laptop computers.”25  At Boston’s 
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, one study showed that 664 
medical devices ran on outdated software.
26
  The hospital reported 
taking one or two medical devices offline each week to remove 
malware.
27
  While software updates are available to combat malware, 
manufacturers may not permit hospitals to update the software on a 
medical device because the manufacturer fears that doing so will 
cause the device to lose FDA approval
28—even though, according to 
the FDA, this is not the case.
29
  Hospitals have described the 
regulatory process to update software as “onerous.”30   
While there are no reports of injuries to patients due to malware 
on medical devices, there have been close calls.  In one hospital, 
“malware at one point slowed down fetal monitors used on women 
with high-risk pregnancies being treated in intensive-care wards.”31  
In another instance, the Conficker worm,
32
 a type of computer virus, 
“caused problems with a Philips obstetrical care workstation, a GE 
radiology workstation, and nuclear medical applications,” although no 
one was apparently injured.
33
  It is likely only a matter of time before 
malware causes harm to a patient in a critical situation. 
Through several controlled experiments, researchers have shown 
that unauthorized access and DDoS attacks against medical devices 
are possible.  In 2008, researchers gained remote access to one type of 
defibrillator.
34
  The researchers conducted a “reprogramming attack,” 
which “changes the operation of (and the information contained in) 
 
 25. Medical Device Security, MCAFEE, 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/industry/healthcare/medical-device-security.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014). 
 26. See Talbot, supra note 24. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Reminder from FDA: Cybersecurity for Networked 
Medical Devices is a Shared Responsibility, FDA (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm189111.htm [hereinafter 
Reminder from FDA]. 
 30. Talbot, supra note 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. See id. 
 32. The Conficker worm can disable Windows security features and download arbitrary 
files.  Help Protect Yourself from the Conficker Worm, MICROSOFT SAFETY AND SECURITY 
CENTER, http://www.microsoft.com/security/pc-security/conficker.aspx#EWC (last visited Feb. 
9, 2014). 
 33. Talbot, supra note 24. 
 34. Halperin, supra note 17, at 1. 
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the defibrillator.”35  The researchers then altered when the device 
administered electric shocks, gaining the ability to administer a shock 
on command.
36
  The researchers also demonstrated that DDoS attacks 
against the device were possible: “[A]n attacker can keep a 
[defibrillator] in a state of elevated energy consumption” by making 
the battery-operated defibrillator communicate indefinitely with an 
outside device.
37
  Because DDoS attacks deplete battery life, this type 
of attack could prevent a defibrillator from functioning when a patient 
needs it.
38
 
In 2010, another set of researchers demonstrated that they could 
gain unauthorized remote access to an insulin pump from 100 feet 
away.
39
  The researchers “(1) chang[ed] already-issued wireless pump 
commands; (2) generat[ed] unauthorized wireless pump commands; 
(3) remotely chang[ed] the software or setting on the device; and (4) 
den[ied] communication with the pump device.”40  In other words, the 
researchers gained the ability to instruct the insulin pump to flood the 
body with insulin, potentially killing a person.  The researchers also 
found that a malicious actor could interrupt the communication 
between the insulin pump and the patient’s insulin control unit, 
preventing the patient from adding insulin to her bloodstream when 
needed.  The researchers noted similar security flaws with wireless 
blood glucose monitors.
41
  Many insulin pump systems also use a 
mobile phone to help patients monitor their glucose levels.
42
  A 
malicious actor who breached the security of the mobile phone may 
be able to use the phone to change the insulin pump’s settings.43 
More recently, security researchers have demonstrated that it is 
possible to hack an insulin pump from as far away as 300 feet away.
44
  
Although previous experiments had required researchers to know the 
pump ID of an insulin pump in order to hack it, the security 
researcher Barnaby Jack created a device that could scan a room 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 2. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Nathanael Paul et al., A Review of the Security of Insulin Pump Infusion Systems, 
5 J. OF DIABETES SCI. & TECH. 1557 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3262727. 
 40. Id. at 1559. 
 41. Id. at 1559-60. 
 42. Id. at 1560. 
 43. Id. 
 44. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 19. 
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looking for insulin pump IDs.
 45
  Using this device, Jack was able to 
identify the insulin pump ID of a volunteer and then cause the insulin 
pump to dispense insulin—up to a deadly dose.46 
It is difficult to know when—and if—a malicious actor will 
exploit these vulnerabilities.  According to security researcher David 
Harley, “there are easier ways of committing mass murder than death 
by pacemaker hacking, and there are certainly easier ways of 
harvesting patient data than by hacking individual devices for the 
meagre [sic] Patient Identifiable Data (PID) that may be embedded 
there.”47  In contrast, security researcher Alexandru Balan notes that 
“‘[a]n unspoken law of IT security is that any vulnerability will 
eventually be exploited. . . . The scenarios that derive from this may 
very well look like crime movies.  Hackers can perform attempts at 
patients’ lives, steal information about high profile public 
figures . . . .’”48  Considering the rise in malware and DDoS attacks 
against hospitals and the recent publicity over the relative ease of 
hacking medical devices, it is likely only a matter of time before a 
malicious actor conducts an attack against a personal medical device 
like a pacemaker or insulin pump.  New approaches are needed to 
guard against these types of attacks. 
B. Cyberattacks on Hospital Networks 
In addition to disrupting the functioning of individual medical 
devices, malware infections may impact an entire hospital network.
49
  
Any network outage at a hospital can cause “chaos.”50  Malware can 
shut down some or all of the computer systems in a hospital.  
According to one security firm, “a multi-day malware outbreak” at a 
 
 45. Researcher Ups Ante on Hacking Medical Devices, INFOSEC ISLAND (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://isa.infosecisland.com/blogview/17785-Researcher-Ups-Ante-on-Hacking-Medical-
Devices.html. 
 46. Id. 
 47. David Harley, Malware and Medical Devices: Hospitals Really Are Unhealthy 
Places, WELIVESECURITY (Oct. 18, 2012, 3:19 AM), http://blog.eset.com/2012/10/18/malware-
and-medical-devices-hospitals-really-are-unhealthy-places. 
 48. Bianca Stanescu, Heart Patients, Diabetics at Increasing Risk from Medical Device 
Malware, HOTFORSECURITY (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.hotforsecurity.com/blog/heart-
patients-diabetics-at-increasing-risk-from-medical-device-malware-4226.html. 
 49. ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 6. 
 50. Siobhan Chapman, Computer Outage Leaves Hospital in Chaos, COMPUTERWORLD 
UK (Nov. 28, 2008, 12:05 PM), http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-
business/12162/computer-outage-leaves-hospital-in-chaos; Bob Brewin, August VA Systems 
Outage Crippled Western Hospitals, Clinics, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE (Oct. 5, 2007), 
http://www.govexec.com/defense/2007/10/august-va-systems-outage-crippled-western-
hospitals-clinics/25469. 
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New York City hospital shut down all of the hospital’s applications, 
with “over 3 million malware compromise attempts per hour.”51  
While the security firm was able to fix the problem within a day, a 
day is a long time for a hospital to function without its computer 
systems.  Other hospitals have also suffered malware outbreaks.  
According to a Veterans Administration report, “173 incidents of 
security breaches of medical devices from 2009-2011 . . . disrupted 
glucose monitors, canceled patient appointments and shut down sleep 
labs.”52 
DDoS attacks can also affect hospital networks.  In 2002, the 
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center’s entire computer system was 
shut down by a “napster-like application that began exchanging 
hundreds of gigabytes of data via multicast to multiple 
collaborators.”53  It took the hospital two days to bring its computer 
systems back online.
54
  In 2009, the FBI foiled the plans of twenty-
six-year-old hacker Jesse McGraw to use a hospital’s computer 
network to launch a DDoS attack on a rival hacker group.
55
  Prior to 
his arrest, McGraw had already “install[ed] malicious botnet code” on 
hospital computers, “allowing him to remotely access the systems, in 
preparation for launching . . . DDoS[] attacks.”56  McGraw had also 
“impaired the integrity of some of the computer systems by removing 
security features, e.g., uninstalling anti-virus programs, which made 
the computer systems and related networks more vulnerable to 
attack.”57  By gaining access to a computer controlling the heating 
and ventilation for the hospital, McGraw “could have affected the 
treatment and recovery of patients who were vulnerable to changes in 
the environment.  In addition, he could have affected treatment 
regimes, including the efficacy of all temperature-sensitive drugs and 
 
 51. See Bat Blue KOs Malware in the First Round!, supra note 9. 
 52. Hall, supra note 8. 
 53. John D. Halamka, The CareGroup Network Outage, LIFE AS A HEALTHCARE CIO 
(Mar. 4, 2008, 5:44 PM), http://geekdoctor.blogspot.com/2008/03/caregroup-network-
outage.html. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Mathew J. Schwartz, Hospital Hacker ‘GhostExodus’ Sentenced to 9 Years, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 22, 2011, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/hospital-hacker-ghostexodus-sentenced-
to/229400039. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Tex., Former Security Guard Who 
Hacked Into Hospital’s Computer System Sentenced to 110 Months in Federal Prison (Mar. 18, 
2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/dallas/press-releases/2011/dl031811.htm. 
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supplies.”58 
Hospital network and medical device security are interrelated.  
Medical devices with poor information security features can act as a 
vector through which malware or DDoS attacks enter hospital 
networks.  According to the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center, “[s]ince wireless [medical 
devices] are now connected to Medical information technology (IT) 
networks, IT networks are now remotely accessible through the 
[medical device]. . . . [T]he communications security of [medical 
devices] is now becoming a major concern.”59  Medical devices must 
therefore have sufficient security features to prevent both tampering 
with the medical device itself and using the medical device as an 
entry point to spread malware or conduct a DDoS attack against a 
hospital network. 
C. Cyberattacks Leading to Theft of Medical Information 
The theft of medical information contained on medical devices 
and networks is a growing threat.  Malware can steal medical 
information from both medical devices and hospital networks.
60
  
Because some medical devices such as insulin pumps wirelessly 
broadcast patient information, malicious actors using specialized 
equipment can access patient medical information from as far as 300 
feet away.
61
  For example, an implanted defibrillator may broadcast 
the patient’s name and diagnosis, in addition to the patient’s vital 
signs.
62
  Malicious actors may also steal patient information directly 
from hospitals.  Ninety-four percent of healthcare providers 
experienced at least one data breach in 2011 or 2012.
63
  According to 
a 2013 Ponemon Institute study, over 1.8 million Americans have 
been affected by medical identity theft, costing on average $18,660 
per victim.
64
  The total out-of-pocket cost of medical identity theft in 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 2. 
 60. Id. at 5. 
 61. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 19. 
 62. Halperin, supra note 17, at 2. 
 63. PONEMON INSTITUTE, THIRD ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PATIENT PRIVACY & 
DATA SECURITY 1 (2012), available at 
http://www2.idexpertscorp.com/assets/uploads/ponemon2012/Third_Annual_Study_on_Patient
_Privacy_FINAL.pdf. 
 64. PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2013 SURVEY ON MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT 4-5 (2013), 
available at http://clearwatercompliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013-Medical-
Identity-Theft-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
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the United States is over $12 billion.
65
  Breaches of PHI almost 
doubled from 2010 to 2011, and “525 breaches . . . involving 21.4 
million individuals” occurred over a three-year period between 2009 
and 2012.
66
 
Medical identity theft can “lead[] to fraudulent claims by the 
criminal entity to the patient’s insurance company or may even 
involve dishonest pharmacists that wire fraudulent prescriptions that 
are eventually sold on the black market.”67  One scheme involved 
stealing the medical information of 7000 patients, encrypting it, and 
then demanding a ransom to unencrypt the information so that 
patients and doctors could access it.
68
  Missing or incorrect patient 
health information can lead to an “improper diagnosis or therapy,” 
which may result in harm or death due to “delayed or inappropriate 
treatment.”69 
 Researchers have recently demonstrated that they could hack two 
widely used medical management platforms that operate medical 
devices.  From these platforms, researchers accessed patient 
information in connected databases.
70
  By gaining access to the 
medical management platform, researchers were also able to 
theoretically operate any medical devices connected to the platform—
such as an X-ray machine.
71
  Given the growing threat of cyberattacks 
against medical devices and hospital networks, new approaches are 
needed to protect patients against attacks that could result in patient 
harm or medical identity theft. 
II. CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURE 
There are three legal regimes governing cyberattacks on medical 
devices and hospital networks.  First, federal statutes such as the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Federal Anti-
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Armerding, supra note 10. 
 67. ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 5. 
 68. Armerding, supra note 10. 
 69. Stephen L. Grimes, Chairman, Medical Device Security Workgroup, Overview of 
Medical Devices and HIPAA Security Compliance 9 (March 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.shcta.com/ftp/Presentations/Overview%20of%20Medical%20Device%20Security%
20and%20HIPAA%20Compliance%20050228.pdf. 
 70. Darren Pauli, Patient Data Revealed in Medical Device Hack, SC MAGAZINE 
AUSTRALIA (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.scmagazine.com/patient-data-revealed-in-
medical-device-hack/article/276568. 
 71. John Leyden, Paging Dr. Evil: Philips Medical Device Control Kit ‘Easily Hacked,’ 
THE REGISTER (Jan. 18, 2013, 5:03 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/01/18/medical_device_control_kit_security. 
BOOTH WELLINGTON  4/2/2014  10:58 PM 
152 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 30 
Tampering Act impose criminal liability on the malicious actors 
behind cyberattacks.  Second, federal regulatory regimes including 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and HIPAA 
govern medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers.  
HIPAA provides some protection against cyberattacks by creating a 
regulatory framework to safeguard PHI.  Under FDCA, the FDA has 
begun to evaluate cybersecurity as a part of the medical device 
approval process.  However, the FDA has only recently issued draft 
guidance in this area and has yet to develop a regulatory approach 
designed to address rapidly evolving security threats.  Finally, civil 
common law and state criminal law impose liability on the malicious 
actors behind cyberattacks and may also impose negligence liability 
on medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers.  As 
discussed in Part III, these legal regimes are insufficient to address the 
threat of cyberattacks because they focus on deterring the malicious 
actors behind cyberattacks rather than on encouraging medical device 
manufacturers and hospitals to improve medical device and hospital 
network security. 
A. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The CFAA
72
 punishes malicious actors who transmit code or 
access protected computers, causing harm.  This Act applies to 
malicious actors who conduct cyberattacks against medical devices 
and hospital networks.
73
  Despite its expansive reach, however, the 
Act only criminalizes knowing and intentional acts.
74
  It does not 
impose negligence liability on the developers or users of medical 
devices or hospital networks with poor security features.
75
  
Nevertheless, it is a powerful statute for prosecuting the malicious 
actors behind cyberattacks. 
The CFAA’s broad language criminalizes almost any knowing or 
intentional cyberattack.  Under the CFAA, “[w]hoever . . . knowingly 
 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)-(B). 
 75. See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir. 2005) (“What protects 
people who accidently erase songs on an iPod, trip over . . . a wireless base station, or rear-end a 
car and set off a computerized airbag, is not judicial creativity but the requirements of the statute 
itself: the damage must be intentional); Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., No. CIV. 00-
100-M, 2001 WL 873063 (D.N.H. July 19, 2001) (noting that a plaintiff could only recover 
under the CFAA against a defendant who violated the statute by accessing the plaintiff’s 
“medical records without authority,” not against the hospital system whose records were 
allegedly violated). 
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causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or 
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes 
damage without authorization, to a protected computer”76 is 
punishable by “a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 
10 years, or both”77 for the first offense.  If the actor “intentionally 
accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result 
of such conduct, recklessly causes damage,”78 the actor faces “a 
fine . . . or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both” for a first 
offense involving: 
(I) [L]oss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year 
period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value, (II) the 
modification or impairment, or potential modification or 
impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or 
care of 1 or more individuals, (III) physical injury to any person; 
[or] (IV) a threat to public health or safety.
79
 
This statutory language criminalizes cyberattacks that cause at least 
$5,000 in harm, physically harm a patient, potentially modify or 
impair patient diagnosis or treatment, or pose a threat to public health 
or safety.  As a result, even if a cyberattack on a medical device or 
hospital network causes no physical harm or property damage, a 
prosecutor may bring charges for “potential” impairment of patient 
care or for posing a “threat” to public health or safety.  Although 
scholars have criticized the CFAA’s sweeping language under the 
“void for vagueness” doctrine,80 most courts apply the statute.81 
 The CFAA only applies to acts involving “computers.”82  Under 
the CFAA, “the term ‘computer’ means an electronic, magnetic, 
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device 
performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions.”83 Recent case 
law makes clear that almost anything with a computer chip—such as 
a digital medical device or hospital network—is a “computer.”  In 
United States v. Kramer, the Eighth Circuit stated that the definition 
 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(B). 
 78. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i). 
 80. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1581 (2010). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Mitra, 405 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2005).  But see United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 
2009). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 83. Id. § 1030(e)(1). 
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of a computer in the CFAA “is exceedingly broad. . . . This definition 
captures any device that makes use of a electronic data processor.”84  
Applying this definition, the court found that a cell phone was a 
computer.
85
  In United States v. Mitra, the Seventh Circuit noted that 
“[s]ection 1030 is general.  Exclusions show just how general. 
Subsection (e)(1) carves out automatic typewriters, typesetters, and 
handheld calculators; this shows that other devices with embedded 
processors and software are covered.  As more devices come to have 
built-in intelligence, the effective scope of the statute grows.”86  
Applying the expressio unius principle, the Mitra court held that a 
radio is a “computer” because it contained a “computer chip.”87 
Based on this case law, hospital networks are covered under the 
CFAA because they utilize “electronic data processor[s]” and 
“computer chips.”  The Department of Justice (DOJ) manual on 
computer crime supports this view.  According to this manual, the 
CFAA: 
[P]rovides strong protection to the computer networks of hospitals, 
clinics, and other medical facilities because of the importance of 
those systems and the sensitivity of the data that they 
contain. . . . The evidence only has to show that at least one 
patient’s medical care was at least potentially affected as a 
consequence of the intrusion.
88
 
The hacker Jesse McGraw was convicted under CFAA Sections 
1030(a)(5)(A) and 1030(c)(4)(B)(i)(II) for accessing a hospital 
network and “downloading a malicious code into a protected 
computer without authorization” and was sentenced to nine years in 
prison,
89
 similarly supporting an interpretation of “computer” that 
applies to hospital networks. 
Under this case law, many medical devices also fall under the 
definition of “computer.”  As long as a medical device has a computer 
 
 84. Kramer, 631 F.3d at 902-04. 
 85. Id. (finding that a cell phone was a computer under the broad definition of 
“computer” under the CFAA even though “a ‘basic’ cell phone might not easily fit within the 
colloquial definition of ‘computer’). 
 86. See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d at 495. 
 87. See id. at 493-94. 
 88. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, COMPUTER CRIME 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION CRIMINAL DIV., PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 45 (2d 
ed. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf. 
 89. United States v. McGraw, No. 3:09-CR-0210-B, 2012 WL 6004208 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 
5, 2012); United States v. McGraw, No. 3:09-CR-0210-B, 2012 WL 6013258 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 
3, 2012). 
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chip or performs basic data processing functions, the CFAA applies.  
Wireless or networked medical devices, for example, are “computers” 
because they must perform data processing functions in order to 
transmit electronic information. 
Given the broad definition of “computer” under the CFAA, 
supported by case law in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, there is 
little question that a malicious actor would violate the CFAA by 
conducting a cyberattack on a medical device or hospital network.  If 
the government can identify the malicious actor behind a cyberattack, 
the CFAA’s expansive language and hefty penalties provide the 
government with a powerful prosecutorial tool.  However, as 
discussed in Part III, it is very difficult to identify the malicious actors 
behind cyberattacks.  Thus while the CFAA may prescribe steep 
penalties for conducting a cyberattack, it may not serve as a sufficient 
deterrent against these attacks.  For this reason, new approaches to 
preventing cyberattacks are needed. 
B. Federal Anti-Tampering Act 
The Federal Anti-Tampering Act
90
 (Anti-Tampering Act) 
criminalizes “tampering” with consumer products, including medical 
devices.  Similar to the CFAA, the Anti-Tampering Act’s steep 
penalties make it a powerful tool for prosecutors.  However, while the 
Anti-Tampering Act likely applies to malicious actors who conduct 
cyberattacks, it does not apply to medical device manufacturers or 
hospitals that negligently fail to secure their devices or networks.  In 
addition, it is an open question whether the Anti-Tampering Act 
applies to a cyberattack on a hospital network or to a cyberattack that 
causes patient harm but does not itself affect the operation of a 
medical device. 
Because there have been no reported cyberattacks on medical 
devices leading to patient harm, the Anti-Tampering Act has not 
received much attention by courts or scholars in the context of 
cyberattacks on medical devices or hospital networks.  The 
government has prosecuted cyberattacks on hospital networks under 
the CFAA, which provides for five- or ten-year sentences, depending 
on whether the actor intentionally or recklessly caused damage.
91
  The 
Anti-Tampering Act penalties are harsher, but they require tampering 
 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
 91. See infra Part II.A. 
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with a “consumer product.”92 A “consumer product” is defined as 
“any ‘food,’ ‘drug,’ ‘device,’ or ‘cosmetic,’”93 which includes 
medical devices
94
 but may not include hospital networks. 
The Anti-Tampering Act does not define “tampering,” leaving 
this term open to interpretation by the courts.
95
  While it is unclear 
how courts will rule on this issue, it is likely that a cyberattack on a 
medical device is “tampering.”  In United States v. Garnett, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction of a defendant under the Anti-
Tampering Act for removing hydrocodone tablets from pill bottles 
and “introducing other drugs into the bottles after scratching off their 
identifying marks.”96  Even though “Garnett did not alter the 
hydrocodone tablets themselves, his actions constitute tampering” 
because “Garnett increased the risk that injury from incorrectly 
dispensed drugs would occur.”97  The court relied on “§1365’s 
purpose—increasing the penalty for willful wrongful conduct” in 
reaching its conclusion.
98
  In United States v. Walton, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the conviction of a pacemaker vendor under the Anti-
Tampering Act for changing the use-by dates of pacemakers and then 
selling the out-of-date pacemakers to hospitals.
99
  The court found 
that Walton’s conduct “falls quite clearly within the statutory 
prohibitions.”100 
 Although most cases prosecuted under the Anti-Tampering Act 
have involved defendants tampering with controlled substances in 
 
 92. Under the Federal Anti-Tampering Act, 
Whoever, with reckless disregard for the risk that another person will be placed 
in danger of death or bodily injury and under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to such risk, tampers with any consumer product that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce, or the labeling of, or container for, any such 
product, or attempts to do so, shall—in the case of attempt, be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; if death of an individual 
results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or 
both; if serious bodily injury to any individual results, be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both; and in any other case, be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012). 
 93. Id. § 1365(h)(1)(A). 
 94. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). 
 95. See United States v. Garnett, 122 F.3d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. United States v. Walton, 36 F.3d 32, 33 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 100. Id. at 35. 
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medical syringes or pill bottles,
101
 the Anti-Tampering Act should 
also apply to defendants who electronically tamper with medical 
devices.  A cyberattack against a medical device may include turning 
off the device or altering the device’s function.  Both actions would 
risk injury to the patient by disrupting the treatment regime, which 
under Garnett should constitute tampering.  A malicious actor who 
hacks into a patient’s medical device and then uses that device as a 
way to access a hospital network (perhaps to conduct a DDoS attack 
or to steal patient health information) could disrupt the device’s 
function, slowing down its processing speed or affecting the ability of 
the medical device to interface with the network.  This conduct should 
also constitute “tampering.” 
Even if a malicious actor does not alter the medical device 
itself—just as the defendant did not alter the hydrocodone tablets in 
Garnett—a cyberattack may fall under the Anti-Tampering Act if the 
defendant’s access to the medical device could potentially harm 
patients.  For example, a malicious actor could use a medical device 
as an access point to disrupt a hospital network, leaving the medical 
device intact but potentially harming other hospital patients relying on 
the hospital network.  Under Garnett, this could fall under the Anti-
Tampering Act’s purpose to penalize “willful wrongful conduct.”  It 
is unclear how a court would come out on this issue. 
It is similarly unclear whether the Anti-Tampering Act 
criminalizes the disruption of a hospital network rather than the 
disruption of a medical device.  The Anti-Tampering Act defines 
“consumer products” broadly to include “devices,” and thus if a 
hospital network is a device, it likely qualifies.  However, it is unclear 
if a hospital network is a medical device.
102
  Even if a hospital 
network is not itself a “device,” hospitals routinely connect medical 
devices to their networks.  If a malicious code shuts down a hospital 
network, and therefore prevents a connected medical device from 
functioning properly, it is possible that the Anti-Tampering Act 
applies.  A court looking to the purpose of this Act under Garnett 
might find liability, whereas a court more strictly construing 
“tampering” might not find liability where the effect on a medical 
device is one step removed from the defendant’s actions.  A court 
could look to the foreseeability of the harm to a medical device to 
 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2006); Jane W. v. 
President & Directors of Georgetown College, 863 A.2d 821 (D.C. 2004); United States v. 
Garnett, 122 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 102. See Mearian, supra note 2. 
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help determine liability under this Act. 
While the Anti-Tampering Act may be somewhat redundant with 
the CFAA, and prosecutors may be more comfortable prosecuting 
malicious actors for computer-related crimes under the CFAA, the 
Anti-Tampering Act may serve as an additional source of criminal 
liability for cyberattacks.  The harsher penalties of the Anti-
Tampering Act may appeal to prosecutors, especially in cases where 
actors have directly hacked medical devices rather than hospital 
networks and the provisions of the Anti-Tampering Act more clearly 
apply.  However, this Act does not impose penalties on medical 
device manufacturers or hospitals that do not adopt measures to 
prevent “tampering” with these devices or networks.  For this reason, 
the Act may ultimately do little to deter cyberattacks. 
C. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
HIPAA regulates the privacy and security of PHI such as patient 
names, diagnoses, and the serial numbers of medical devices.
103
  
Accordingly, HIPAA plays a central role in medical device 
cybersecurity.  HIPAA does not, however, address some of the central 
issues posed by the threat of cyberattacks on medical devices and 
hospital networks.  Because HIPAA focuses on the security of PHI, it 
does not address cyberattacks that disrupt devices or networks but do 
not involve a breach of PHI.  HIPAA also does not apply to most 
medical device manufacturers.  As a result, HIPAA incentivizes 
hospitals to adopt more secure networks—at least where PHI is 
involved—but does little to incentivize medical device manufacturers 
to adopt security features.  Despite its underinclusiveness, HIPAA’s 
strict liability scheme provides an example of one approach to 
protecting against cyberattacks. 
HIPAA imposes significant responsibilities on healthcare 
providers to protect against unauthorized disclosure of PHI, levying 
large fines on providers who suffer breaches of PHI as a result of theft 
or accident.  HIPAA has two main parts: the Privacy Rule and the 
Security Rule.  The Privacy Rule “establishes national standards to 
protect individuals’ medical records and other personal health 
information” and “requires appropriate safeguards to protect the 
privacy of personal health information.”104  The Security Rule 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. The Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014). 
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“requires appropriate administrative, physician and technical 
safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and security of 
electronic protected health information.”105 
HIPAA only applies to “covered entities.”  These include 
hospitals and other healthcare providers, but do not include medical 
device manufacturers unless they “sell to patients and bill 
Medicare.”106  Some medical device manufacturers, such as insulin 
pump manufacturers, are covered entities because they sell directly to 
Medicare patients.
107
  Most, however, are not.  HIPAA’s criminal 
provisions apply to covered entities and certain employees of covered 
entities, but not to individuals unassociated with the covered entity.
108
 
Regulations promulgated under the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
109
 (HITECH Act) 
impose harsh penalties for HIPAA violations and require covered 
entities to notify patients of a PHI breach.  The HITECH Act 
enforcement rule provides penalties for four different violation 
categories: “Did Not Know,” “Reasonable Cause,” “Willful 
Neglect—Corrected,” and “Willful Neglect—Not Corrected.”  The 
penalties range from $100 to $50,000 for each violation in the first 
category and are $50,000 for each violation in the fourth category.  
“Violations of an identical provision in a calendar year” are capped at 
$1.5 million.
110
  The HITECH Act requires covered entities to 
“promptly notify affected individuals of a breach, as well as the U.S. 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary and the media in cases 
 
 105. The Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS,, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014). 
 106. Privacy Basics: A Quick HIPAA Check for Medical Device Companies, MEDICAL 
DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.mddionline.com/article/privacy-
basics-quick-hipaa-check-medical-device-companies. 
 107. See id. 
 108. But see Alabama Woman Sentenced to Prison for Patient Identifications at Hospital, 
PRIVATE OFFICER NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://privateofficernews.wordpress.com/tag/chelsea-catherine-stewart (noting that a woman 
unassociated with a hospital was sentenced to three years in prison under a HIPAA criminal 
provision for “stealing identifying information on more than 4,000 patients from a Birmingham 
hospital”); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Ala., Alabaster Woman Indicted 
for Stealing Hospital Patient Information (June 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/aln/News/June%202011/June%2028,%202011%20Alabaster 
%20Woman.html. 
 109. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300jj, 17931-40 (2013). 
 110. HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 74 Fed. Reg. 56127 (proposed 
Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/enforcementrule/enfifr.pdf. 
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where a breach affects more than 500 individuals.”111  The DOJ has 
the power to bring criminal cases against covered entities that 
“knowingly” violate HIPAA,112 although it rarely does so.113  A 
criminal conviction could result in steep fines
114
 and exclusion from 
Medicare, a serious penalty.
115
 
The consequences of a HIPAA breach are severe, even when the 
breach is accidental or the result of theft.  For example, the Alaska 
Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) paid $1.7 million 
in a settlement with HHS after a USB drive containing the health 
information of 2000 patients was stolen.
116
  A HHS investigation 
determined that “DHSS had not completed a risk analysis, 
implemented sufficient risk management measures, completed 
security training for its workforce members, implemented device and 
media controls, or addressed device and media encryption as required 
by the HIPAA Security Rule.”117  Phoenix Cardiac Surgery, a 
physician practice, paid $100,000 in a settlement with HHS after an 
Office of Civil Rights investigation determined “that the physician 
 
 111. HITECH Breach Notification Interim Final Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/breachnotificationifr.html 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2014); see also Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health 
Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 42740 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-08-24/pdf/E9-20169.pdf. 
 112. Under Section 1320d-6, HIPAA criminalizes “knowingly and in violation of this 
part—(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier; (2) obtains individually 
identifiable health information relating to an individual; or discloses individually identifiable 
health information to another person.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2012). 
 113. See DOJ Steps Up Enforcement with Indictment of ‘Loose Lips’ Doctor, Hospital 
Visitor, HEALTH BUSINESS DAILY (July 15, 2011), http://aishealth.com/archive/hipaa0711-01 
(noting that DOJ “had prosecuted only a dozen or so criminal HIPAA violations in eight years” 
and describing two additional cases); The HIPAA Medical Privacy Law: The Current State of 
Criminal Enforcement, KAISER LAW FIRM, PLLC (May 23, 2012), 
http://kaiserfirm.com/lawyer/2012/05/23/Health_Care_Fraud/The_HIPAA_Medical_Privacy_La
w__The_Current_State_of_Criminal_Enforcement_bl4229.htm. 
 114. The penalty for violation is a fine of up to $50,000, a one-year term of imprisonment 
or both.  42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(1).  “[I]f the offense is committed under false pretenses,” the 
fine is “not more than $100,000,” imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both.  Id. § 1320d-6(b)(2).  
“[I]f the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health 
information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,” the violator may “be 
fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”  Id. § 1320d-
6(b)(3). 
 115. Id. § 1320d-6(b)(3). 
 116. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Alaska Settles HIPAA Security Case 
for $1,700,000 (June 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/06/20120626a.html. 
 117. Id. 
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practice was posting clinical and surgical appointments for its patients 
on an Internet-based calendar that was publically accessible.”118  
Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary (MEEI) agreed to a $1.5 million 
settlement with HHS after “an unencrypted personal laptop containing 
the electronic protected health information (ePHI) of MEEI patients 
and research subjects was reported stolen.”119 
HHS has begun prosecuting small-scale breaches of PHI.  In 
June of 2010, a laptop containing the PHI of fewer than 500 patients 
was stolen from the Hospice of North Idaho (HONI).
120
  HONI “had 
not conducted a risk analysis to safeguard []PHI” and “did not have in 
place policies or procedures to address mobile security as required by 
the HIPAA Security Rule.”121  In January of 2013, the hospice agreed 
to a $50,000 settlement with HHS.
122
  The HONI case demonstrates 
that covered entities must protect against even small-scale loss or 
theft of PHI. 
While HIPAA provides for significant penalties for PHI 
breaches, HIPAA does not adequately address the threat of 
cyberattacks.  HIPAA is focused on protecting patient health 
information—not patient health.  HIPAA does not incentivize 
hospitals to adopt security measures to protect against cyberattacks 
that do not involve PHI.  It is possible that a malicious actor could 
conduct a cyberattack against a medical device or hospital network 
without accessing PHI and thus never run afoul of HIPAA.  HIPAA 
also does not apply to most medical device manufacturers.  Increased 
HIPAA prosecution of medical device manufacturers’ customers, 
such as hospitals, will likely put pressure on medical device 
manufacturers to take information security risks into account when 
designing devices.  Nevertheless, HIPAA fails to create a direct 
incentive for medical device manufacturers to adopt improved 
security measures.  While HIPAA is a step in the right direction, it 
does not provide sufficient protection against the threat of 
cyberattacks. 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Erin McCann, Massachusetts Group to Pay $1.5M HIPAA Settlement, HEALTHCARE 
IT NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/massachusetts-group-pay-
15m-hipaa-settlement. 
 120. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Announces First HIPAA 
Breach Settlement Involving Less than 500 Patients: Hospice of North Idaho Settles HIPAA 
Security Case for $50,000 (Jan. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/01/20130102a.html. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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Although HIPAA is not designed to address all types of 
cyberattacks, it provides a regulatory model for combatting 
cybercrime.  HIPAA focuses on the entities subject to attack, not the 
attackers.  Such an approach is needed in the realm of cybercrime, 
where the attacker may be difficult or impossible to identify.
123
  
HIPAA’s sliding scale liability scheme—including strict liability for 
data breaches where the covered entity “Did Not Know” and was not 
at fault—incentivizes covered entities to determine the best way to 
protect PHI.  This type of approach makes sense where government 
regulators may not be able to respond quickly to new security risks.  
HIPAA’s strict liability scheme permits the government to prosecute 
(or negotiate settlements) with covered entities in an area where the 
common law negligence standard of care is unclear.  Until courts 
grapple with more cyberattack cases, the standard of care for 
protecting medical device and hospital networks against cyberattacks 
will likely remain unclear—providing a rationale for adopting this 
type of approach.  Although HIPAA has its flaws, the Act addresses 
some of the weaknesses of a traditional regulatory scheme that is 
unable to respond quickly and flexibly to changing threats.  While 
HIPAA itself does not provide sufficient protection against 
cyberattacks, it does provide a model for regulating security risks in a 
digital world.  As described in Part IV, Congress could expand 
HIPAA to more fully address the risk of cyberattacks against medical 
devices and hospital networks. 
D. Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 
Although the FDA issued draft guidance on medical device 
cybersecurity in June of 2013,
124
 the agency has yet to develop a 
forward-looking regulatory approach that addresses new cyberattack 
threats.  The FDA has many different regulatory tools—including the 
premarket notification and approval processes and the postmarket 
review process—that could help ensure that medical device 
manufacturers and hospitals take precautions against cyberattacks.  
The FDA has also asserted its authority over mobile medical 
applications (MMAs) and medical device data systems (MDDSs), 
allowing the FDA to regulate medical device software and 
information storage systems.  Until recently, the FDA has not used 
these tools to ensure that medical devices protect patients from the 
 
 123. See infra Part III.A. 
 124. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 11.  
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threat of cyberattacks in part because the FDA “did not consider 
information security risks from intentional threats as a realistic 
possibility . . . .”125  The FDA’s challenge, as described in Parts III 
and IV, is to recalibrate its regulatory structure to address the rapidly 
evolving threat of cyberattacks.   
1. Overview of FDA Regulation 
a. Premarket Notification and Approval 
While the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
126
 and 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
127
 play a role 
in medical device regulation, the FDA is the primary regulator of 
medical devices.  The FDA’s power to regulate “medical devices” is 
very broad and includes regulation of medical devices, components 
and accessories of medical devices, MMAs, MDDSs, and likely 
hospital networks
128
 that interface with medical devices.
129
  Under this 
expansive definition of “medical devices,” the FDA has extended its 
regulatory authority to new types of devices, from smartphones that 
 
 125. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1. 
 126. The FCC has regulatory authority over “various media and communication 
technologies, including the allocation of frequencies and the specification of technical 
requirements to ensure the security and reliability of wirelines, broadband, and wireless 
communication devices.” Vernessa T. Pollard & Chandra Branham, FDA Medical Device 
Requirements: A Legal Framework for Regulating Health Information Technology, Software, 
and Mobile Apps, RECENT DEV. IN FOOD & DRUG LAW 2011, 2011 WL 5833341, at *9.  FCC 
has agreed to partner with FDA to “develop a coordinated regulatory approach for wireless-
enabled medical devices, mobile apps, and other health IT.”  Id.; see Margaret A. Hamburg, 
Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the FDA/FCC Public Workshop: Enabling the 
Convergence of Communications and Medical Systems (July 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm220447.htm. 
 127. CMS is not “being as active from an enforcement standpoint with respect to health IT 
products.”  Vernessa T. Pollard & Chandra Branham, FDA Medical Device Requirements: A 
Legal Framework for Regulating Health Information Technology, Software, and Mobile Apps, 
RECENT DEV. IN FOOD & DRUG LAW 2011,  2011 WL 5833341, at *9.  However, CMS could 
play a much greater role in determining which medical devices and mobile applications to 
reimburse under federal programs like Medicare.  Id. 
 128. Mearian, supra note 2. 
 129. Under the FDCA, 
The term ‘device’ . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, 
contrivance, implant in vitro reagent, or similar or related article, including any 
component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for the use in the diagnosis 
of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease . . . or . . . intended to affect the structure or other function of the 
body . . . and which does not achieve its primary intended purpose through 
[chemical or metabolic action]. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). 
BOOTH WELLINGTON  4/2/2014  10:58 PM 
164 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 30 
allow doctors to view ultrasound images
130
 to software “intended for 
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions.”131 
Under the Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976 (MDAA), 
there are three regulatory classifications for medical devices.
132
  
“Class I devices are typically simple in design, manufacture and have 
a history of safe use,” such as “tongue depressors, arm slings, and 
hand-held surgical instruments.”133  These devices are unlikely to 
have wireless connections or otherwise be subject to cyberattacks, 
although as discussed below, medical device data systems are now 
Class I devices.  A device falls under Class II if there are more 
concerns about its “safety and effectiveness.”134  Examples of these 
types of devices are insulin pumps,
135
 “physiologic monitors, x-ray 
systems, [and] gas analyzers.”136  The majority of wireless medial 
devices are Class II devices.
137
  Class III medical devices are those 
devices that are “life-supporting or life-sustaining, or for a use which 
is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human 
health, or if the device presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness 
or injury.”138  This includes devices like cardiac defibrillators.139 
There are three different levels of regulatory review of medical 
 
 130. See Scott Jung, Mobisante’s MobiUS Smartphone Ultrasound Receives FDA 510(k) 
Clearance, MEDGADGET (Feb. 7, 2011, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.medgadget.com/2011/02/mobisantes_mobius_smartphone_ultrasound_receives_fda
_510k_clearance.html. 
 131. Scott D. Danzis & Christopher Pruitt, Rethinking the FDA’s Regulation of Mobile 
Medical Apps, 9 THE SCITECH LAWYER, no. 3, 2013, available at 
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/56c8d97e-4432-4623-b81c-
1230545cc204/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cb8b13fe-9b8f-4de4-b8d3-
15096d3b25be/Rethinking_the_FDA’s_Regulation_of_Mobile_Medical_Apps.pdf. 
 132. Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976, 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c (West 2014). 
 133. 2008-04 FDA Device Classification, LEEDERGROUP [hereinafter FDA Device 
Classification], http://leedergroup.com/bulletins/fda-device-classification (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014). 
 134. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-
title21-vol8/pdf/CFR-2012-title21-vol8-sec860-3.pdf. 
 135. Id. § 880.5725 (2014), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/cfrsearch.cfm?fr=880.5725. 
 136. FDA Device Classification, supra note 133. 
 137. Wireless Medical Technologies: Navigating Government Regulation in the New 
Medical Age, FISH & RICHARDSON, at 6, 
http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/attachments/FinalRegulatoryWhitePaperWirelessMedical 
Technologies.pdf (last updated Nov. 2013). 
 138. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-
title21-vol8/pdf/CFR-2012-title21-vol8-sec860-3.pdf. 
 139. 21 C.F.R. § 870.5310 (2013), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=870.5310. 
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devices: Premarket approval (PMA), 510(k) premarket notification, 
and quality controls.  The highest level of review is the lengthy and 
expensive PMA process, which “demands extensive and meticulous 
documentation to demonstrate safety and effectiveness.”140  If PMA is 
not required, all medical devices must undergo 510(k) review unless 
the device is exempt from premarket notification.
141
  “A 510(k) is a 
premarket submission made to the FDA to demonstrate that the 
device to be marketed is at least as safe and effective, that is, 
substantially equivalent” to a device already on the market when the 
MDAA was passed in 1976.
142
  The 510(k) process is roughly three 
times faster and fifty times cheaper than the PMA process.
143
  
Manufacturers of devices that are subject to FDA regulation but do 
not require PMA or 510(k) review still “need to adopt a quality 
system, register and list with the FDA, and report adverse events 
associated with their product.”144 
Some devices—primarily Class I devices—are only subject to 
quality controls.
145
  Most Class II devices and three-fourths of Class 
III devices receive 510(k) treatment, while the remaining Class III 
devices undergo PMA review.
146
  The MDAA originally envisioned 
that all new medical devices would undergo PMA review.  However, 
because PMA review is so lengthy and expensive, manufacturers 
attempt to demonstrate that new Class III devices are “substantially 
equivalent” to devices that were on the market in 1976 and thus 
subject to only 510(k) review.  The FDA clears 99% of devices 
subject to premarket approval or notification under the 510(k) process 
and only 1% under the PMA process.
147
  The 510(k) premarket 
notification process is therefore the primary process through which 
medical devices with wireless or network capabilities reach the 
 
 140. Adam Lewin, Medical Device Innovation in America: Tensions Between Food and 
Drug Law and Patent Law, 26 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 403, 408-09 (2012), available at 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v26/26HarvJLTech403.pdf.  
 141. Premarket Notification (510k), FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/prem
arketsubmissions/premarketnotification510k/default.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 142. Id.; see Lewin, supra note 140, at 409. 
 143. Lewin, supra note 140, at 409. 
 144. Brian Dolan, Understanding FDA’s New MDDS Rule, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Feb. 15, 
2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/10234/understanding-fdas-new-mdds-rule. 
 145. See Overview of Medical Devices and Their Regulatory Pathways, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/C
DRHTransparency/ucm203018.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 146. Lewin, supra note 140, at 409. 
 147. Id. 
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market. 
Despite the extensive testing that goes into the PMA process, 
prior to 2013, the “FDA ha[d] not begun to consider risks resulting 
from intentional threats,”148 such as cyberattacks.  While 
manufacturers of Class II and Class III devices had to conduct 
“software validation and risk analysis” in order to receive FDA 
approval,
149
 the FDA did not require analysis of vulnerability to 
cyberattacks.  A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
analysis of the 2001 and 2006 PMA supplements for two medical 
devices with known security risks noted that the “FDA did not 
demonstrate that it had considered the potential benefits of mitigation 
strategies to protect devices against information security risks from 
certain unintentional or intentional threats in light of the appropriate 
level of acceptable risk for medical devices with known 
vulnerabilities.”150  In the 2012 PMA for a defibrillator, the FDA did 
consider information security threats.  However, it only considered 
unintentional threats.
151
  Additionally, the FDA did not engage in 
extensive testing of devices against specific threats, such as “testing 
of attempts to enter incorrect or invalid data in the device or the use of 
fuzzing, an information security-related testing technique that uses 
random data to discover software errors and security flaws.”152 
Following the GAO report, the FDA released draft guidance on 
medical device and hospital network cybersecurity in June 2013.
153
  
Although the guidance applies to both PMA and 510(k) 
submissions,
154
 it is not binding.
155
  At five pages in length, the 
guidance document lays out basic principles rather than specific 
recommendations.  Echoing HIPAA, the document states that 
“[m]anufacturers should develop a set of security controls to assure 
medical device cybersecurity to maintain information confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability.”156  The document advises manufacturers to 
 
 148. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 25. 
 149. 21 C.F.R. § 820.30(g) (West 2014), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/cfrsearch.cfm?fr=820.30. 
 150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 24-25. 
 151. Id. at 25. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. at 2. 
 156. Compare id. at 2, with 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2013) (“Risk analysis 
(Required). Conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and 
vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health 
BOOTH WELLINGTON 4/2/2014  10:58 PM 
2014] CYBERATTACKS ON MEDICAL DEVICES 167 
“consider cybersecurity during the design phase of the medical 
device.”157  The document also recommends basic security features, 
such as user authentication and restriction of updates to authenticated 
code.
158
  Although these recommendations are important because they 
signal a new focus on cybersecurity by the agency, they provide only 
a basic overview of cybersecurity considerations.
159
 
The draft guidance is not, however, without teeth.  FDA 
regulations already require manufacturers to conduct a “risk analysis” 
of medical device software to obtain FDA approval.  The draft 
guidance expands the meaning of “risk” to include both unintentional 
and intentional security threats: “Manufacturers should define and 
document . . . their cybersecurity risk analysis and management plan 
as part of the risk analysis required by 21 CFR 820.30(g).”160  This 
statement suggests that the FDA may exercise its authority under 
existing regulations to reject devices that are vulnerable to intentional 
cyberattacks even before the agency promulgates new rules 
addressing intentional security threats. 
The FDA has refused to accept a 510(k) application for review 
because the application failed to address the new draft guidance.
161
  
Although at least one commentator has suggested that it was unlawful 
for the FDA to act on the basis of draft guidance,
162
 the FDA has a 
strong argument that the phrase “risk analysis” is broad enough to 
include analysis of both intentional and unintentional threats.  Under 
this view, the “draft” guidance is in part a statement of how the FDA 
will interpret existing regulations rather than merely a set of 
recommendations for manufacturers.  Device manufacturers will 
likely take the draft guidance seriously going forward, although the 
FDA may face an administrative law challenge to its authority to 
regulate under this guidance. 
 
information . . . .”), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2007-title45-
vol1/pdf/CFR-2007-title45-vol1-sec164-308.pdf. 
 157. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124, at 3. 
 158. See id. at 4. 
 159. See Erik Vollebregt, FDA’s Draft Guidance on Cybersecurity: Nothing Exciting but 
Useful Examples, MEDICALDEVICESLEGAL (June 17, 2013), 
http://medicaldeviceslegal.com/2013/06/17/fdas-draft-guidance-on-cybersecurity-nothing-
exciting-but-useful-examples. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Allyson B. Mullen, Premature Enforcement of CDRH’s Draft Cybersecurity 
Guidance, FDA LAW BLOG (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/09/premature-enforcement-of-
cdrhs-draft-cybersecurity-guidance.html. 
 162. See id. 
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 The FDA’s refusal to accept a 510(k) application that does not 
comply with its draft guidance on cybersecurity demonstrates the 
need to recalibrate the device classification and approval process to 
better address cybersecurity concerns.  Most new devices are cleared 
through the 510(k) process.  The 510(k) process, however, is 
primarily concerned with demonstrating the substantial equivalence 
of a new device to an existing device—not with the inherent safety or 
effectiveness of the new device.
163
  The 510(k) pathway appears 
especially ill-suited to evaluating medical devices with network 
capabilities.  A medical device that was safe in 1976 may no longer 
be safe once it has the capability to connect to a hospital network or 
broadcast a wireless signal. 
 The FDA has addressed weaknesses in the 510(k) approval 
process through policy and guidance documents.  One commentator 
notes that “as FDA issues more and more policies and guidance 
documents, the standard for 510(k) clearance seems to move further 
from being equivalent to a device currently on the market to meeting 
FDA’s new heightened standards. . . .”164  From a cybersecurity 
perspective, draft guidance from the FDA is better than no guidance.  
From an administrative law perspective, however, the FDA may be 
vulnerable to legal challenges if it tries to aggressively enforce its 
guidance documents.  To stay within the bounds of its regulatory 
authority, the FDA may be forced to issue less aggressive guidance 
and policy documents and hope industry will comply.
165
  This may 
prevent the FDA from taking a strong stance on cybersecurity.
166
  It 
may also create uncertainty for medical device manufacturers.
167
  
Many commentators have suggested that the 510(k) process is 
 
 163. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE 
FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Medical-Devices-and-the-Publics-
Health-The-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-at-35-
Years/510k%20Clearance%20Process%202011%20Report%20Brief.pdf (“When the FDA 
assesses the substantial equivalence of a device, it generally does not require evidence of safety 
or effectiveness; and when a device is found to be substantially equivalent to a predicate device, 
the new device is assumed to be as safe and effective as the predicate because of its similarity.”). 
 164. See Mullen, supra note 161. 
 165. See generally K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
507, 538 (2011) (“FDA currently produces roughly twice as many guidance documents per year 
as legislative rules, and statistics suggest its annual output of guidance has increased 
regularly.”). 
 166. See id. (“[T]o the extent FDA relies on guidance as its primary mode of 
policymaking, it may find it increasingly difficult to win victories in court.”). 
 167. See id. (“The Supreme Court has offered little further guidance regarding the level of 
deference that informal FDA documents warrant.”). 
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flawed,
168
 and the poor fit between the 510(k) process and 
cybersecurity concerns is one more reason for Congress to revisit the 
medical device approval process. 
b. Post-Market Review 
The FDA uses three primary methods of post-market regulation 
of medical devices: adverse event reporting, postapproval studies, and 
postapproval reports.  The FDA uses the Manufacturer and User 
Facility Device Experience Database (MAUDE) to monitor adverse 
events involving medical devices once they are on the market.
169
  As 
part of the PMA or 510(k) process, the FDA may require medical 
device manufacturers to conduct postapproval studies “to identify 
potential problems.”170  The FDA also requires medical device 
manufacturers to prepare annual postapproval reports.
171
  As the GAO 
report revealed, the FDA could use post-market regulation more 
effectively to protect against information security threats. 
MAUDE could help identify cybersecurity issues that impact 
patient care.  The FDA uses codes to categorize different types of 
adverse events, and “although FDA does not categorize its codes as 
specifically related to information security problems, it has codes in 
place that could potentially identify information security problems 
resulting from . . . intentional threats.”172  Adverse events may include 
problems such as “(1) an application issue, (2) the unauthorized 
access to a computer system, or (3) a computer-security issue.”173  
The Veteran’s Administration (VA) Office of Information Security 
manages a robust reporting system for malware infections.
174
  In its 
database, the VA identified over 142 incidents involving 207 devices 
between January 2009 and December 2011.
175
  The FDA could 
 
 168. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 163, at 3 (“[T]he FDA’s finite 
resources would be better invested in developing an integrated premarket and postmarket 
regulatory framework that provides a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness 
throughout the device life cycle.”). 
 169. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 9-10; see 21 C.F.R. pt. 803 
(West 2014). 
 170. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 10; see 21 C.F.R. pt. 803 
(West 2014).  For devices cleared through the 510(k) process, postapproval studies are called 
“522 studies.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 10 n.18. 
 171. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 30-31. 
 172. Id. at 29-30. 
 173. Id. at 29. 
 174. See FDA Preparing for the Hacking of Medical Devices, ORTHOSTREAMS (Aug. 27, 
2013), http://orthostreams.com/2013/08/fda-preparing-for-the-hacking-of-medical-devices. 
 175. See id. 
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similarly use MAUDE to help flag cybersecurity flaws that lead to 
adverse events.  Given the FDA’s recent focus on cybersecurity 
issues, the agency may be moving in this direction.  Better software is 
likely needed.  As one researcher warns, in the MAUDE database 
“real problems may be obscured by hundreds, if not thousands, of 
unhelpful reports that are all lumped together.”176 
To complement its adverse event reporting system, the FDA 
could also require manufacturers to conduct postapproval studies of 
their devices.  According to the 2012 GAO report, “FDA officials 
said that, while they could require manufacturers to conduct 
postmarket studies to focus on information security risks, they did not 
currently have plans to request that any manufacturers do so.”177  The 
2013 FDA draft guidance on cybersecurity recommends that 
manufacturers submit a “systematic plan for providing validated 
updates and patches to operating systems or medical device software, 
as needed, to provide up-to-date protection and to address the product 
life-cycle.”178  Because the FDA has already requested that 
manufacturers create a plan to keep their devices up-to-date, the FDA 
could take this request one step further by requiring manufacturers to 
conduct postmarket studies of device cybersecurity and report their 
findings to the FDA.  While it may be too costly to require all 
manufacturers to conduct such studies, requiring postapproval studies 
of high-risk devices could help ensure that manufacturers abide by the 
cybersecurity plans submitted during the approval process. 
The FDA could also require manufacturer postapproval reports 
to include an analysis of cybersecurity concerns.  Postapproval reports 
must include information about any changes the manufacturer made 
to the device during the preceding year, including software 
changes.
179
  The reports must also detail any defects in the device 
identified in scientific literature.
180
  The GAO report revealed, 
however, that these reports may not be comprehensive.  GAO 
examined the annual postapproval reports of a defibrillator that 
researchers hacked in a 2008 study.  The postapproval reports did not 
mention the study, even though it was published in scientific literature 
and demonstrated a significant security flaw in the device.
181
  
 
 176. Id. (describing presentation by Jay Radcliffe). 
 177. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 30. 
 178. CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124, at 4. 
 179. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 30-31. 
 180. Id. at 31. 
 181. Id. 
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Similarly, the postapproval report of an insulin pump hacked by 
researchers in 2010 did not include any reference to information 
security issues.
182
  The FDA could take a more active role in auditing 
these reports for accuracy and in emphasizing that these reports must 
include cybersecurity risks. 
In addition to more comprehensive adverse event reporting, 
postapproval studies, and postapproval reports, the FDA should also 
consider more proactive approaches to identifying new cyberattack 
risks.  The type of risk posed by an intentional cyberattack is different 
from the type of risk posed by software or hardware flaws that 
unintentionally cause injury.  Intentional threats constantly evolve.  A 
device that is safe when first put on the market may develop a 
security flaw as hackers develop new techniques or discover new 
software vulnerabilities.  Instead of monitoring adverse events and 
manufacturer reports, the FDA should work with manufacturers to 
proactively identify software flaws before cyberattacks occur.  Part IV 
describes some of the elements of a proactive and flexible regulatory 
approach to protecting against cyberattacks. 
2. FDA Regulation of Mobile Medical Applications 
Following the proliferation of medical devices with software 
components and the dramatic increase in health-related mobile 
applications (apps), the FDA has begun to regulate these devices and 
apps.  The FDA has no “overarching software policy.”183  The text of 
the FDCA is broad, defining a medical device to include any 
“instrument,” “apparatus,” or “contrivance,” and “any component, 
part, or accessory” that is used to diagnose or treat disease.184  The 
FDA has reduced confusion over whom and what it will regulate by 
releasing its September 2013 final guidance on MMAs
185
 and its Final 
Rule on MDDSs.
186
  However, neither the MMA guidance nor the 
MDDS rule mentions cybersecurity concerns.  The FDA may need to 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
STAFF – MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS (2011) [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FDA-mHealth-Draft-
Guidance.pdf. 
 184. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2010). 
 185. FDA, MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocu
ments/UCM263366.pdf. 
 186. See infra Part II.D.3. 
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revisit its MMA classification scheme to ensure that its regulation of 
MMAs takes into account the risk of cyberattacks. 
The FDA defines MMAs broadly.  An MMA is a device “used 
as an accessory to a regulated medical device; or to transform a 
mobile platform into a regulated medical device.”187  MMAs include 
apps that perform the following functions: (1) “[d]isplaying, storing, 
analyzing, or transmitting patient-specific medical device data” as an 
extension of a medical device; (2) “[t]ransform[ing] a mobile 
platform into a regulated medical device” by using “attachments, 
display screens, [or] sensors;” or (3) “performing patient-specific 
analysis and providing patient-specific diagnosis, or treatment 
recommendations.”188  The FDA looks to an app’s “intended use” to 
determine whether it is a regulated device, including its “labeling 
claims, advertising materials, or oral or written statements by 
manufacturers or their representatives.”189  If the app is used to 
diagnose or treat disease, the app is a “device.”  Almost any mobile 
app that is useful to doctors in a medical setting will constitute an 
MMA.  According to FDA guidance, an app that controls a cell phone 
light becomes a regulated medical device if the manufacturer markets 
the app as a tool for examining patients.
190
 
The FDA regulates MMAs based on the classification of the 
device associated with the MMA or whose function the MMA 
replaces.  “[M]anufacturers must meet the requirements associated 
with the applicable device classification.”191  For example, “a mobile 
app that displays radiological images for diagnosis transforms the 
mobile platform into a class II” device.192  An MMA manufacturer 
includes not only the company that creates the app software but also 
“anyone who initiates specifications, designs, [or] labels” the app.193  
For example, a hospital is a device manufacturer if it hires a software 
firm to design an MMA.  This definition of “manufacturer” imposes 
FDA oversight on hospitals, which also face HHS regulation of 
information security under HIPAA.  MMA distributors, such as 
iTunes, do not constitute MMA manufacturers.
194
 
 
 187. FDA, supra note 185, at 12. 
 188. Id. at 14-15. 
 189. Id. at 8. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 13. 
 192. Id. at 15. 
 193. FDA, supra note 185, at 9. 
 194. Id. at 11. 
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The FDA guidance on MMAs raises a number of important 
questions about medical device and hospital network cybersecurity.  
By expanding the definition of “device” to cover most medical-
related mobile applications, the FDA opens the door to significant 
regulation of MMAs.  As the FDA begins to regulate more 
comprehensively against cyberattacks, the FDA will be able to 
regulate the security features of wireless and networked devices in 
addition to mobile devices and even the software running mobile 
devices.  Because all of these devices work together, it makes sense to 
develop an overarching regulatory approach to cybersecurity. 
A device’s classification determines how much regulatory 
oversight it receives.  As a result, the classification of an MMA will 
determine how closely the FDA scrutinizes the app’s information 
security features.  One potential issue is that a medical device may be 
a Class I device—and thus subject to little or no regulation—which 
could mean that an MMA associated with the device similarly 
receives little or no scrutiny.  While the MMA may not pose a health 
risk to the patient, it may nevertheless constitute a cybersecurity 
threat.  MDDSs, for example, are Class I devices yet may still be 
vulnerable to cyberattack.
195
  Similarly, Class II and a Class III 
MMAs may pose exactly the same cybersecurity risk—and even run 
on exactly the same software—but may receive different scrutiny 
under the 510(k) and PMA approval processes.  While the FDA’s 
draft guidance on cybersecurity may help alleviate this inconsistency, 
the FDA likely needs to develop a new classification scheme for 
cybersecurity threats.  
3. FDA Regulation of Medical Device Data Systems 
In addition to its guidance on MMAs, the FDA has issued a final 
rule governing MDDSs. These systems are “passive databases and 
communications software products”196 that store information but do 
not actively interact with medical devices or provide decision 
support.
197
  An example of an MDDS is software that stores blood 
pressure readings.
198
 
Because of the lower risks associated with MDDSs, the FDA 
 
 195. See infra Part II.D.3. 
 196. Dolan, supra note 144. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Medical Device Data Systems, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/GeneralHospitalDevicesan
dSupplies/MedicalDeviceDataSystems/default.htm (last updated Apr. 19, 2011). 
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issued a final rule in 2011 that declassified MDDSs from Class III to 
Class I medical devices.  This rule makes MDDSs “exempt from 
premarket review but still subject to quality standards.”199  The FDA’s 
rationale for this rule is that quality controls are sufficient to ensure 
the safety and effectiveness of MDDSs.
200
 
Although the final MDDS rule downgraded MDDSs to Class I 
devices, it also expanded FDA regulatory authority to include some 
types of previously unregulated software.
201
  For example, the MDDS 
classification now includes “hospital-derived software” with an 
intended use in the medical field and “hardware, such as modems, 
that are expressly promoted as part of the system.”202  The FDA’s 
exertion of broader regulatory power over medical software makes 
sense in part because this software could pose an information security 
risk to medical devices or hospital networks, although it is not clear 
that the FDA’s decision to broaden its regulatory power was 
motivated by these concerns. 
One potential danger in downgrading MDDSs to Class I devices 
is that they will receive little regulatory oversight beyond the 
specification of general controls.  This is problematic if an MDDS 
contains a security flaw that permits a malicious actor to hack an 
entire hospital network.  Because MDDSs are databases that store 
information, they are targets for cyberattacks seeking PHI for medical 
identity theft.  MDDSs are also likely to be hooked up to hospital 
networks so that physicians can remotely access the information 
contained in the MDDS.  A security flaw in an MDDS may allow a 
malicious actor or malware to infiltrate a hospital network.  It makes 
little sense to impose the draft cybersecurity guidance on Class II and 
Class III medical devices
203
 but not on Class I MDDSs.  Accordingly, 
the FDA should reconsider its classification system when evaluating 
the cybersecurity risk posed by MDDSs that are connected to medical 
networks. 
4. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation 
Act 
The FDASIA of 2012 established a new pathway for classifying 
medical devices.  The FDASIA states that “[i]n lieu of submitting a 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Dolan, supra note 144. 
 202. Id. 
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report under section [510](k) . . . if a person determines there is no 
legally marketed device upon which to base a determination of 
substantial equivalence . . . a person may submit a request under this 
clause for the Secretary to classify the device.”204  The FDASIA 
responds in part to criticism of the “substantial equivalence” 
framework of the 510(k) process.  The FDA has not yet released 
guidance on how it will implement the FDASIA, so it is difficult to 
know how this law will change the regulatory process for medical 
devices.  The FDASIA permits the FDA to rethink its medical device 
classification scheme, providing the FDA with an opportunity to 
adopt a regulatory structure that better addresses the risk of 
cyberattacks. 
E. Tort Liability 
Injured patients may have a civil cause of action against 
malicious actors, hospitals, or medical device manufacturers 
following a cyberattack against a medical device or hospital network.  
On one hand, it seems unlikely that a court would find a legal barrier 
to a civil suit against a malicious actor who conducts a cyberattack 
and physically harms a person.  On the other hand, cyberattacks do 
not comfortably fit within the traditional framework of battery and 
trespass to chattels actions.  Until a body of case law develops, it is 
unclear how these actions will play out in court.  A patient injured by 
a cyberattack may also have a cause of action against medical device 
manufacturers and hospitals for negligence.  The success of the suit 
will likely depend on how the court treats the superseding cause 
doctrine and on how the court views the defendant’s standard of care.  
It is likely that state courts will ultimately develop doctrines that 
impose liability on medical device manufacturers and hospitals that 
negligently fail to take precautions against cyberattacks.  Without 
more certainty, however, the threat of civil liability may not provide a 
sufficient incentive for medical device manufacturers and hospitals to 
adopt cybersecurity measures. 
1. Malicious Actors 
Plaintiffs harmed in a cyberattack may bring suit against the 
cyberattacker under tort theories including battery and trespass to 
 
 204. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)(A)(ii) (2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2012-title21/pdf/USCODE-2012-title21-chap9-
subchapV-partA-sec360c.pdf. 
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chattels.
205
  A battery theory is likely to succeed, although courts have 
yet to grapple with potentially thorny issues such as whether a 
cyberattack satisfies the “intent” and “offensive touching” elements of 
battery.  Trespass to chattels, which is the intentional interference 
with personal property leading to injury, is another potential cause of 
action.  Courts will likely need to reinterpret elements of both torts to 
address the issues raised by digital attacks that cause physical harm to 
patients. 
a. Battery 
Battery requires an intentional “offensive touching of the 
plaintiff’s person, or something so closely associated with the plaintiff 
as to make the touching tantamount to a physical invasion of the 
plaintiff’s person.”206  Courts are split on whether:  
[T]he Second Restatement’s definition of intent is properly 
interpreted to require both intent to make bodily contact and, in 
addition, intent to harm or offend (dual intent), or whether it is 
sufficient that the defendant intends to make a bodily contact that 
turns out to be harmful or offensive (single intent).
207
   
Plaintiffs may have difficulty proving the “intent” element of 
battery in some cyberattack cases.  A malicious actor who 
intentionally conducts a cyberattack against a medical device likely 
meets the “intent” prong.  A programmer who writes malware that 
happens to infect a medical device and harm a patient, however, may 
not have “intent” to commit battery.  First, the programmer may not 
have intended the code to have any effect on physical reality, 
undermining the argument that the programmer intended a “touching 
of the plaintiff’s person.”  Second, the programmer may not have 
intended harm.  For example, the programmer may only have 
intended to steal a patient’s medical identity, not cause physical 
injury.  In cases where the plaintiff can only show intent to touch the 
plaintiff’s person and not intent to cause harm, the definition of intent 
adopted by the court will likely govern the outcome of the case. 
Satisfying the element of “offensive touching” may also be 
difficult.  The success of the action may depend on how closely 
 
 205. Some commentators have suggested that a plaintiff may also have a nuisance claim 
against a cyberattacker.  See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 53-54 (2000). 
 206. Neal Hoffman, Battery 2.0: Upgrading Offensive Contact Battery to the Digital Age, 
1 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 61, 68 (2010). 
 207. See Kerr, supra note 80, at 1597. 
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associated a medical device is with the plaintiff’s body.  The 
comments to the Second Restatement of Torts note that: 
Since the essence of the plaintiff’s grievance consists in the offense 
to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion 
of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical harm done 
to his body, it is not necessary that the plaintiff’s actual body be 
disturbed.  Unpermitted and intentional contacts with anything so 
connected with the body as to be customarily regarded as part of 
the other person and therefore as partaking of its inviolability is 
actionable as an offensive contact with her person.
208
 
There is a strong argument that at least some medical devices, 
such as pacemakers and insulin pumps, are “closely associated with 
the plaintiff.”  Other medical devices, however, may not be as closely 
integrated with the plaintiff’s physical body.  A heart rate monitor, for 
example, may play an important role in monitoring a patient’s health.  
A cyberattack against a hospital network that shuts down the heart 
rate monitor, or that prevents the physician from accessing the heart 
rate monitor from a mobile device, may have no physical effect on the 
patient.  However, without the ability to monitor the patient, the 
physician may not catch the warning signs of a heart attack.  While it 
seems likely that a court would stretch the element of “offensive 
touching” to apply in this type of situation, it is also possible that 
some courts may decline to find this element of battery satisfied.  
Courts may also struggle with defining “touching” to include digital 
touching, although courts may overcome this hurdle by defining 
“touching” broadly or by focusing on the physical movement of 
electrons.  While it seems likely that a court would hold a defendant 
liable for intentionally harming a patient through a cyberattack, courts 
may need to reinterpret traditional tort principles to address the issues 
raised by digital attacks that cause physical harm.  
b. Trespass to Chattels 
Trespass to chattels is a tort that some courts have applied in the 
context of unauthorized use of computer systems.  “Trespass to 
chattels lies where an intentional interference with the possession of 
personal property has proximately cause[d] injury.”209  To establish a 
claim, the plaintiff must show that “(1) defendant intentionally and 
without authorization interfered with plaintiff’s possessory interest in 
the computer system; and (2) defendant’s unauthorized use 
 
 208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c (1965). 
 209. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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proximately resulted in damage to the plaintiff.”210  In eBay, Inc. v. 
Bidder’s Edge, Inc., eBay alleged that another company’s 
unauthorized access to its website had increased the load on its 
system, resulting in monetary damages.
211
  The court found for eBay, 
holding that eBay had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits for a trespass to chattels claim because the defendant company 
had repeatedly accessed information on eBay’s website without 
permission.
212
 
When a malicious actor accesses a medical device or hospital 
network without permission, downloading data or interfering with the 
device, the owner of the medical device or network may have a claim 
for trespass to chattels if the court follows the reasoning of the eBay 
decision.  The patient relying on the medical device or hospital 
network, however, may not have a claim under this tort theory unless 
she has a possessory interest in the device or network.  The trespass to 
chattels doctrine may therefore allow a hospital to sue a malicious 
actor who attacks its network or device, but it may not provide a 
cause of action for an injured patient.  Trespass to chattels is 
ultimately an old doctrine with uncertain application in the digital era.  
While some courts may allow a trespass to chattels claim, others may 
not.  The legal uncertainty around the application of battery and 
trespass to chattels theories may reduce the deterrence effect of tort 
law on the malicious actors behind cyberattacks. 
2. Medical Device Manufacturers and Hospitals 
A hospital or medical device manufacturer may be negligent if it 
fails to adopt reasonable cybersecurity measures.  It may be difficult, 
however, to define the duty of care in the context of cyberattacks.  
Experts have only recently identified cyberattacks as a realistic threat.  
Furthermore, cybersecurity standards will continue to evolve, making 
the identification of a standard of care difficult.  In some states, the 
superseding cause doctrine blocks negligence liability where a 
malicious actor is the direct cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.  
Additionally, Riegel v. Medtronic dictates that once the FDA clears a 
medical device through the PMA process, plaintiffs cannot sue the 
device manufacturer in tort under most circumstances.
213
  Given these 
difficulties, the success of a negligence action against a medical 
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device manufacturer or hospital is uncertain. 
a. Duty of Care 
At common law, a hospital or medical device manufacturer is 
negligent if it breaches a duty of care towards an injured individual.  
The duty of care to ensure that networks and devices are secure from 
outside intrusion is unclear.  It is likely that a court would look to 
HIPAA standards to help define at least the lower limit of a hospital’s 
duty of care.  Other standards, such as those promulgated by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology
214
 or the International 
Organization for Standardization,
215
 may also serve as a benchmark 
for the duty of care.  HIPAA standards do not generally apply to 
medical device manufacturers, however, and thus a court may or may 
not hold a medical device manufacturer to relevant HIPAA standards.  
While the recent FDA draft guidance on cybersecurity may provide a 
benchmark for courts, the guidance is general and non-binding.
216
  
Until courts regularly grapple with negligence suits following 
cyberattacks, the duty of care is likely to remain uncertain. 
The duty of care is also complicated by the fact that information 
security measures may detract from patient care.  Installing 
encryption or security programs on implantable medical devices may 
require larger batteries, which in turn could require either larger 
devices—potentially decreasing the safety and efficacy of the medical 
device—or devices with a significantly shorter battery life.  Battery 
life is especially important for implantable medical devices like 
pacemakers.  A court may hesitate to impose such a duty of care on a 
medical device manufacturer.  Network security features, such as 
complicated login systems, may make it more difficult for doctors to 
access patient information in emergency situations.  Mobile device 
security requirements may also make it more difficult for doctors to 
check on patients remotely.  The FDA’s draft guidance on 
cybersecurity recognizes the tension between security and patient 
care.
217
  These arguments could sway courts in at least some cases to 
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find no duty of care to adopt certain security measures. 
The class action plaintiffs’ complaint in a data breach case 
against TJX Companies outlines some of the arguments a plaintiff 
might bring in a negligence case against a medical device 
manufacturer or hospital following a cyberattack.  After a hacker stole 
the credit card information of thousands of TJX customers, affected 
customers brought a complaint alleging that TJX had a “special 
fiduciary relationship” with its customers because it stored customers’ 
personal and financial information and that this relationship created a 
“duty of care to use reasonable means to keep nonpublic information 
of the Class private and secure.”218  Plaintiffs alleged that TJX was 
negligent because it failed to comply with industry standards and 
because the data breach was extremely large and took place over a 14-
month period.
219
  In a cyberattack case, plaintiffs might similarly 
argue that a medical device manufacturer, and especially a hospital, 
has a fiduciary relationship with its patients, creating a duty of care to 
protect against cyberattacks.
220
  The level of compliance with industry 
standards and the magnitude of the attack may also factor into the 
duty of care. 
Critics have noted that HIPAA standards do not go far enough in 
requiring security measures for mobile devices.  For example, HIPAA 
does not require “the ability to remotely wipe sensitive patient data” 
on mobile devices.
221
  If a hospital or medical device manufacturer 
meets HIPAA standards but does not go beyond them, a court may 
find that it has satisfied the duty of care—even if the HIPAA 
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standards do not adequately protect medical device or hospital 
network information security.  The fact that HIPAA does not apply to 
most medical device manufacturers, and that HIPAA addresses 
threats to protected health information rather than all types of 
cyberattacks, makes it difficult in many cases for courts to use 
HIPAA to determine the duty of care.  While the FDA draft 
cybersecurity guidelines are applicable to medical device 
manufacturers, they are not applicable to hospital networks.  These 
guidelines are also general and non-binding.  Without a clear duty of 
care, a court may hesitate to impose liability for negligence.  Given 
these potential obstacles to tort liability, Part IV outlines three 
potential approaches to addressing the threat of cyberattacks on 
medical devices and hospital networks. 
b. Superseding Cause 
Hospitals and medical device manufacturers may also avoid tort 
liability if a court finds that the malicious actor behind a cyberattack 
is the “superseding cause” of the attack.  “A ‘superseding cause’ is an 
intervening act that operates to relieve the original actor of liability 
for the ultimate harm even though the original actor was a factual 
cause of that harm.”222  Courts generally adopt one of two approaches 
to superseding cause.
223
  Under the first approach, the court will find a 
superseding cause only if the intervening act is unforeseeable.  
Foreseeability is a matter of fact for the jury to decide.
224
  Under the 
second approach, adopted by the Third Restatement of Torts, the 
court focuses on proximate cause rather than the foreseeability of the 
intervening act.
225
  The Third Restatement “focuses the inquiry on 
whether the type of harm suffered by the injured party was within the 
scope of the risk presented by the original actor’s tortious conduct.”226  
This proximate cause analysis looks at whether the “ultimate harm” is 
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foreseeable, not whether the intervening act is foreseeable.
227
 
These two different formulations of the superseding cause 
doctrine can lead to different outcomes.  The first approach asks 
whether it is foreseeable that a malicious actor would conduct a 
cyberattack on a medical device or hospital network.  Because there 
have been no reported cases of patient harm caused by cyberattacks 
on medical devices or networks, there is an argument that these 
attacks are not foreseeable.  However, the GAO report and researcher 
experiments demonstrating that medical devices can be hacked 
provide a good argument that hospitals and medical device 
manufacturers should foresee cyberattacks.
228
  Malware attacks on 
devices and hospital networks are much more common and thus are 
more foreseeable.  The specific type of attack, however, may not be 
foreseeable.  It is therefore difficult to know how a court would rule 
on the issue of foreseeability. 
The second approach asks whether it is foreseeable that 
negligence by medical device manufacturers or hospitals would lead 
to harm from cyberattacks.  This too is an open question.  According 
to Professors Kesan and Hayes, “[b]ecause the connection between 
cybersecurity measures and cyberattacks is self-evident, and lax 
cybersecurity could foreseeably lead to negative consequences from 
cyberattacks, a court following the [second approach] would likely 
find that the causal relationship is preserved, and would thus be likely 
to conclude that proximate cause still exists.”229  However, there is 
also an argument that no matter how good the information security 
measures, a creative actor may find a way to breach them.  The 
foreseeability issue may in part depend on the creativity of the attack.  
Again, it is difficult to know how courts will rule on the issue of 
foreseeability under the second approach, adding one more level of 
uncertainty to a negligence claim against hospitals and medical device 
manufacturers. 
c. Riegel v. Medtronic 
Under Riegel v. Medtronic,
230
 manufacturers of medical devices 
cleared through the lengthy and expensive PMA process are generally 
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not subject to state tort suits.
231
  In Riegel, the Supreme Court “held 
that because the FDA imposes rigorous design, manufacturing, and 
labeling requirements on Class III devices, tort claims that would 
impose requirements different from or additional to the FDA’s 
requirements are preempted.”232  State tort law that is “‘parallel’” to 
FDA requirements is not preempted.
233
  Tort suits against the 
manufacturers of devices that have been approved under the 510(k) 
process, including many Class III devices cleared under 510(k), are 
also not preempted.
234
  Because most wireless devices, such as insulin 
pumps, are Class II devices, the majority of tort suits are not 
preempted.  However, some important medical devices—such as 
cardiac defibrillators—are Class III devices cleared under the PMA 
process. 
Class III devices are “life-supporting or life-sustaining, or for a 
use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of 
human health, or if the device presents a potential unreasonable risk 
of illness or injury.”235  For this reason, malicious actors may target 
PMA-cleared Class III devices for cyberattacks.  Because Riegel as a 
policy measure places its trust in the FDA to ensure the safety of 
PMA-cleared devices, it is especially important for the FDA to 
regulate the information security features of these PMA-cleared 
devices.  While the FDA has released draft guidance on cybersecurity, 
this guidance is not mandatory.  Part IV discusses potential reforms 
that could give the FDA a greater role in medical device 
cybersecurity. 
III. GAPS IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Three different legal structures govern cyberattacks against 
medical devices and hospital networks.  Criminal law focuses 
primarily on deterring the malicious actors behind cyberattacks.  
Federal regulatory regimes such as the FDCA and HIPAA provide a 
framework for regulating medical device manufacturers and 
healthcare providers.  Common law principles may impose liability 
 
 231. See id. 
 232. See Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Medical Devices and Preemption: A Defense of Parallel 
Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196, 
1196 (2011). 
 233. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. 
 234. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 235. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-
title21-vol8/pdf/CFR-2012-title21-vol8-sec860-3.pdf. 
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on medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers that 
negligently fail to protect against cyberattacks.  As described in this 
Part, however, these legal structures do not fully address the threat of 
cyberattacks.  As long as it remains difficult to identify and prosecute 
the actors behind cyberattacks, criminal law is an insufficient 
deterrent.  FDCA and HIPAA were not designed to protect against 
cyberattacks against medical devices and do not provide sufficient 
regulatory safeguards in this area.  The scope of negligence liability 
for medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers is untested 
and unclear.  New approaches are needed to address the threat of 
cyberattacks. 
A. Difficulty of Effective Prosecution of Malicious Actors 
Behind Cyberattacks 
The malicious actors behind cyberattacks face criminal liability 
under several federal statutes in addition to common law civil liability 
and possible state criminal liability.  However, the difficulty of 
identifying and prosecuting cyberattackers greatly undercuts the 
deterrence power of these laws.
236
 
As many commentators have noted, it is often difficult or 
impossible to identify the actor behind a cyberattack.
237
  “In 
cyberspace, attackers can hide their identity, cover their tracks. 
Worse, they may be able to mislead, placing blame on others by 
spoofing the source.”238  For example, the malicious actor behind a 
2009 DDoS attack against U.S. and South Korean government and 
business websites remains unknown.
239
  Because the attack was 
 
 236. Some academic literature questions whether our current legal regime ever achieves 
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relatively unsophisticated, almost anyone could have orchestrated 
it.
240
  Criminal law may attempt to deter crimes where few 
perpetrators are caught by making the penalties large.  While 
penalties under the CFAA and the Anti-Tampering Act are large—
ranging from five to twenty years in prison
241—even large penalties 
may fail to deter where identification of the perpetrator is very 
difficult.
242
  In the near term, it is unlikely that it will become any 
easier to identify the actors behind cyberattacks.
243
 
Once identified, it may be difficult to prosecute cyberattackers.  
Selecting the appropriate venue may be challenging if the attack 
occurs across state or national lines.
244
  For domestic defendants, “the 
complexity of Internet routing creates jurisdictional conflicts among 
the localities, states, and countries that wish to exercise jurisdiction 
over transient information packets.”245  Prosecution of foreign 
defendants is even more difficult.  U.S. criminal statutes like the 
CFAA likely do not apply extraterritorially.
246
  If the cyberattacker 
resides outside of the United States, she may succeed in dismissing a 
suit on forum non conveniens grounds.
247
  While there are 
international regimes in place to address cyberattacks, foreign 
governments do not consistently enforce them.
248
 
Although criminal liability for cyberattacks under statutes like 
the CFAA is relatively clear, civil liability is murkier due to 
unresolved questions about how torts like battery and trespass to 
chattels apply in cyberspace.
249
  Plaintiffs may be unsure which tort 
theory to choose, and courts may differ on how broadly they interpret 
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common law principles to accommodate digital acts.
250
 
The malicious actors behind cyberattacks may also be relatively 
judgment proof,
251
 decreasing the deterrence effect of tort liability and 
increasing the risk that cyberattacks will lead to uncompensated harm.  
The actors behind recent cyberattacks against the Department of 
Defense have ranged from Chinese military agents to a sixteen-year-
old Florida student.
252
  Conducting a cyberattack may not require 
extensive investment
253
 but may nevertheless lead to significant 
physical and monetary harm to patients and healthcare providers.    
Together, the difficulty of identifying, prosecuting, and 
recovering damages from the malicious actors behind cyberattacks 
counsels against relying solely on criminal and civil penalties against 
these actors to deter attacks.   
B. Poor Fit of Current FDA Device Classification Scheme to 
Cyberattack Threat 
The current medical device classification system does not always 
reflect the cyberattack risk posed by a particular device.  Traditional 
medical devices fall under one of three classifications, with Class I 
devices receiving little oversight and Class III devices often 
undergoing the extremely expensive PMA process.
254
  MMAs receive 
the same classification as the device they are associated with.
255
  The 
FDA regulates MDDSs as Class I medical devices.
256
 
In the case of targeted attacks against an individual’s wireless 
medical device, such as a pacemaker or insulin pump, the current 
classification scheme aligns with the threat posed by a cyberattack.  
The importance of the device to the patient’s health will likely 
correlate with the potential harm to the patient if a malicious actor 
manipulates or disables the device. 
In the case of cyberattacks against MDDSs or hospital networks, 
however, the medical device classification may bear little relation to 
the risk posed by a cyberattack.  To the extent that a medical device 
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of any classification is connected to a hospital network, it may be 
used as an entry point to disrupt the network or steal information from 
the network.  Whether an MMA is a Class II device used as an insulin 
monitor or a Class I device used to create a meal plan for a diabetic, a 
flaw in the MMA software could pose a security risk to the entire 
hospital network.  Class I MDDSs may be “passive” repositories of 
patient data and thus may pose little risk to patient health.  However, 
repositories of patient data are a treasure trove for identity thieves.  
From an identity theft perspective, a Class III pacemaker containing 
the identifying information of one patient may be far less valuable 
than a Class I passive database containing thousands of patient 
records.  The exact same type of device may run on off-the-shelf 
software that is more vulnerable to cyberattacks or on proprietary 
software that is less vulnerable to cyberattacks.
257
  The current device 
classification system does not reflect these distinctions.  Concerns 
over the fit of the medical device classification system to the threat 
posed by cyberattacks support the need for further regulatory reforms, 
such as those discussed in Part IV. 
C. The Role of Medical Device Manufacturers and Large 
Healthcare Providers in Preventing Cyberattacks 
Medical device manufacturers and large healthcare providers 
play an important role in preventing cyberattacks.  The FDA 
recognizes this, stating in a 2009 “Reminder from the FDA” that 
“cybersecurity for medical devices and their assembled 
communication networks is a shared responsibility between medical 
device manufacturers and medical device user facilities.”258  One 
striking feature of the current regulatory regime, however, is that it 
does not harness the ability of industry to adopt cybersecurity 
measures.  According to one commentator, the CFAA “does not 
provide an incentive for anyone to adopt adequate anti-hacking 
security measures.  In fact, network security remains at a[] shockingly 
low level and is virtually nonexistent in many companies despite the 
severity of the hacking threat.”259  While medical device 
manufacturers may adopt the FDA draft guidance on cybersecurity, 
this guidance is not mandatory.  New legal and regulatory 
frameworks are needed to ensure that medical device manufacturers 
and large healthcare providers protect against cyberattacks.   
 
 257. See ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 2. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS TO STATUTORY AND REGULATORY GAPS 
Because the current statutory and regulatory framework is not 
adequate to address the threat of cyberattacks on medical devices and 
hospital networks, new approaches are needed.  One potential 
approach is industry self-regulation.  A second approach is to equip 
the FDA with expanded authority and resources to identify and 
address security risks before cyberattacks occur.  This would likely 
require a new focus by the agency, which has previously relied on a 
backward-looking analysis of adverse events rather than a forward-
looking analysis of emerging security threats.  FAA regulation of 
airline safety could provide a model for this type of regulatory 
process.  A third approach is to create a new legislative framework to 
address cyberattacks.  Because HIPAA provides a preexisting model 
for addressing information security issues in the healthcare industry, 
an expansion of HIPAA to cover medical device manufacturers and to 
protect against the risk of all types of intentional cyberattacks—not 
just those involving PHI—is one potential legislative solution.  All 
three approaches provide a starting point for considering solutions to 
twenty-first century cybersecurity threats. 
A. Industry Self-Regulation 
Industry self-regulation is common in the healthcare space and 
could play an important role in helping to design hospital networks 
and medical devices that are less vulnerable to cyberattacks.  Two 
examples of industry self-regulation are The Joint Commission’s 
healthcare provider accreditation process
260
 and the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Code
261
 for 
pharmaceutical marketing activities.  The Joint Commission is an 
independent non-profit that accredits and certifies over 20,000 
healthcare programs and organizations in the United States.
262
  As an 
independent organization, The Joint Commission mediates between 
private industry, state regulators, and patients without the strictures of 
the administrative rulemaking process.
263
  The Joint Commission 
 
 260. See About The Joint Commission, THE JOINT COMMISSION, 
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releases new standards annually and frequently posts policy revisions 
on its website,
264
 leading to an adoption of new standards that is more 
rapid than a state or federal regulatory process.  Compliance with 
these standards is often mandatory because states require many 
healthcare providers to receive accreditation from an organization 
such as The Joint Commission.
265
  The Joint Commission 
accreditation process represents a successful approach to industry 
self-regulation that permits the ongoing creation of new standards in 
consultation with both private industry and public regulators to 
address new challenges in the healthcare industry.  
The PhRMA Code is another example of industry self-
regulation.  To address concerns over pharmaceutical marketing 
practices, industry participants created the PhRMA Code’s voluntary 
guidelines for marketing activities.
266
  Shortly thereafter, the U.S. 
Office of Inspector General, which investigates healthcare fraud and 
abuse, designated the PhRMA Code as the minimum standard for 
marketing to healthcare professionals,
267
 laying the groundwork for 
later legislation.  The Physician Payment Sunshine Act of 2009, 
adopted as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), built on the 
PhRMA Code and FDA guidelines by requiring certain disclosures 
related to marketing practices.
268
  By developing and voluntarily 
adopting the PhRMA Code, industry participants took the first steps 
towards addressing an important industry concern and also helped 
shape future legal and regulatory requirements.  
The Joint Commission accreditation process and the PhRMA 
Code demonstrate that industry self-regulation can help address safety 
concerns and confront new industry challenges.  In the highly 
regulated healthcare industry, self-regulation may play an important 
role in a larger government regulatory framework.  As healthcare 
providers and medical device manufacturers begin to confront the 
challenges posed by cybersecurity, they could develop industry 
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standards to guide the creation of new software and systems that help 
protect against cyberattacks.  This type of approach could allow 
industry to more quickly and flexibly address emerging cybersecurity 
threats while potentially reducing the need for burdensome federal 
and state regulatory requirements.  Because the FDA is likely to take 
an increasing role in cybersecurity regulation, an industry attempt to 
address these issues could also lead to a better dialogue between the 
agency and medical device manufacturers.  The PhRMA Code 
provided an important starting place for later laws and regulations 
addressing pharmaceutical and medical device marketing, and 
medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers would be wise 
to similarly take a proactive stance towards developing new 
approaches to address the threat of cyberattacks. 
B. Forward-Looking FDA Regulation to Address Rapidly 
Evolving Threats 
A second approach to protecting against cyberattacks is to 
develop a FDA regulatory structure that proactively identifies and 
protects against evolving information security threats.  This would 
represent a shift from existing agency practice.  Currently, the FDA 
relies primarily on adverse event reporting and postmarket studies to 
monitor the continuing effectiveness of medical devices—techniques 
that may be ineffective at preventing cyberattacks before they occur. 
In conjunction with a more forward-looking approach, the FDA could 
develop a flexible regulatory process that permits the agency to work 
with medical device manufacturers and hospitals to address 
cyberattack threats in proportion to the risk posed. 
 The FDA’s draft guidance on cybersecurity is a step in the right 
direction.  The guidance adopts several of the information security 
recommendations listed in the GAO report, such as encryption 
software, frequent antivirus and anti-spyware updates, and 
authentication procedures.
269
  The FDA has solicited comments on the 
guidance
270
 and will likely use it as a starting point for developing 
more detailed cybersecurity standards.  The FDA has also recently 
released twenty-five new standards for medical device 
interoperability and security.
271
  In conjunction with industry and 
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cybersecurity experts, the FDA should continue to develop standards 
that help secure the thousands of different types of medical devices 
and networks against cyberattacks. 
Building on these standards, the FDA should develop a strategy 
for identifying cybersecurity threats before they materialize, rather 
than after malicious actors exploit them.  The FDA does not currently 
regulate hospital networks,
272
 and the agency relies on a system of 
adverse event reporting, postapproval studies, and postapproval 
reports to monitor medical devices already on the market.
273
  Adverse 
event reporting identifies medical device flaws only after patient harm 
(or a near miss) has occurred.  Annual postapproval reports may come 
too late to alert the FDA of cyberattack threats.  While postapproval 
studies could focus on information security risks, these studies 
generally focus on risks identified at the time the device was 
approved, not risks that emerge later.
274
  The FDA’s Sentinel System, 
a national electronic system that monitors the postmarket safety of 
medical products, represents an initiative to replace passive 
postmarket monitoring with more active surveillance.
275
  However, 
even this initiative focuses on recognizing safety issues as they occur 
rather than on preventing them from occurring in the first place.
276
 
Protecting against intentional cyberattacks requires a different 
approach than protecting against unintentional medical device defects.  
The FDA has announced that it will develop a cybersecurity 
laboratory to test medical devices for security flaws.
277
  If the FDA 
uses this lab to continuously and proactively monitor the 
cybersecurity of medical devices currently on the market, this lab 
could be a valuable tool in protecting against cyberattacks.  In order 
to use this lab effectively, however, the FDA will have to equip itself 
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with the latest information about potential new medical device 
security flaws.  In addition to hiring scientists, the FDA should hire 
hackers who can pinpoint new security vulnerabilities.  The FDA 
should also develop a program to work with other government 
agencies, security companies, medical device manufacturers, and 
healthcare providers to identify and find solutions to new information 
security risks.  The biggest challenge will be to identify and respond 
to new cyberattack threats quickly enough to flag these issues for 
manufacturers and healthcare providers before attacks materialize.  
The FDA may need to seek additional funding and potentially new 
regulatory authority from Congress to take on this type of role in 
identifying and protecting against cyberattacks.  
In addition to conducting its own proactive monitoring of 
cybersecurity risks, the FDA should leverage industry compliance 
programs to ensure manufacturers similarly identify and protect 
against new threats.  Medical device manufacturers are likely in the 
best position to know the weaknesses in their devices and to monitor 
their devices for new vulnerabilities.  The FDA’s draft guidance 
recommends that manufacturers create a systematic plan for updating 
device security.
278
  If the FDA can require manufacturers to develop 
robust cybersecurity programs to gain approval for their devices, the 
FDA can then monitor manufacturers to ensure compliance with these 
programs.  However, the FDA may need to issue new regulations or 
look to Congress for authority to penalize device manufacturers who 
do not adhere to their cybersecurity programs.   
 Once the FDA identifies a new risk through its own investigation 
or through industry reporting, it will have to develop a flexible and 
tailored approach to mitigating the risk.  Unlike hardware flaws that 
are difficult to repair—such as faulty wiring in a pacemaker—
software flaws may be easier to fix.  Unlike hardware flaws, however, 
a mandatory software patch may quickly turn into a liability if it 
hinders future security patches or creates a new vulnerability.  The 
FDA will have to tread carefully.  If the FDA promulgates very 
specific cybersecurity standards and ties premarket review or 
approval to meeting these standards, there is a significant risk that 
such standards will quickly become outmoded.  Out-of-date standards 
that do little to improve cybersecurity may impose unnecessary costs 
on companies.  By requiring one method of addressing a security 
threat, out-of-date standards could hinder cybersecurity by preventing 
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companies from adopting a new and better method of addressing a 
security flaw.  Many medical device companies are unwilling to 
update outmoded software because of the fear that their products will 
lose FDA approval;
279
 detailed FDA regulation of cybersecurity could 
further exacerbate this problem. 
The FAA’s airworthiness directive process serves as a model for 
a regulatory process where the agency takes an active role in 
identifying and remedying ongoing, and sometimes minor, safety 
risks.  If the FAA finds that unsafe conditions exist, the FAA may 
issue an airworthiness directive that requires air carriers to correct the 
unsafe condition within a certain period of time.
280
  The FAA may 
also approve an “alternative method of compliance,” such as the use 
of different procedures or service instructions, as long as an 
“acceptable level of safety is maintained.”281  The FAA adopted the 
airworthiness directive process as a way to improve safety by 
increasing coordination between the agency and the airline 
industry.
282
  A similar approach that is focused on communication 
between the FDA and medical device manufacturers and hospitals 
could improve safety while leaving room to flexibly address evolving 
cybersecurity threats. 
Many different government agencies will need to rethink their 
regulatory processes to respond to rapidly evolving technology and 
the threat of intentional cyberattacks.  Monitoring adverse events may 
be sufficient to detect and correct unintentional risks; fighting 
intentional attacks may require a more proactive and vigilant 
approach.  Speed and flexibility will be important.  While the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment process does not 
lend itself to these characteristics, the FDA could look to other 
regulatory agencies such as the FAA for examples of how to quickly 
and flexibly respond to new risks.   
C. Expanding HIPAA to Address the Threat of Cyberattacks on 
Medical Devices and Hospital Networks 
While FDA reforms will help, Congress must ultimately revisit 
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the question of how to protect medical devices and hospital networks 
against cyberattacks.  HIPAA governs the information security of 
hospital networks, but it does not apply to cyberattacks that do not 
involve PHI.  HIPAA also does not apply to most medical device 
manufacturers.  FDCA regulates medical devices but not hospital 
networks.  FDCA’s current device classification scheme reflects the 
harm to patients posed by unintentional threats, but not by intentional 
cyberattacks.  A Class I MDDS may provide a vehicle for a malicious 
actor to attack a hospital network, whereas a Class III pacemaker may 
not be hooked up to a hospital network at all.  While the FDA’s 
guidance on cybersecurity is a step in the right direction, it is not 
mandatory.  Criminal law may eventually deter the malicious actors 
behind cyberattacks, and tort law may eventually incentivize 
manufacturers and providers to adopt cybersecurity measures.  For the 
present, however, criminal and tort law are ineffective tools.  What is 
needed is a regulatory scheme that applies to both medical devices 
and hospital networks, and that imposes sensible but mandatory 
requirements on manufacturers and hospitals. 
HIPAA provides a starting point for a new regulatory scheme.  
Congress could expand HIPAA’s information security requirements 
to apply to medical device manufacturers.  Because HIPAA already 
applies to a small number of device manufacturers that sell directly to 
Medicare patients,
283
 it is conceivable that Congress could expand 
HIPAA to apply to all device manufacturers.  Congress could also 
expand HIPAA to apply to any type of cyberattack that harms patient 
health or privacy.  Limiting HIPAA to attacks involving PHI makes 
little sense when cyberattacks could harm patient health without 
involving PHI. 
Expanding HIPAA would force Congress to address the question 
of how HHS and the FDA should work together to regulate 
cyberattacks against medical devices and hospital networks.  HHS 
oversees HIPAA, while the FDA oversees FDCA.  In addition, many 
different agencies play some role in protecting against cyberattacks.
284
  
The federal Information Security and Privacy Board “finds that 
diffusion of responsibility when it comes to cybersecurity of medical 
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devices raises growing concern.”285  Because medical devices are now 
an integral part of hospital networks, at the very least FDA and HHS 
should develop a joint regulatory scheme.  FDA’s draft guidance on 
cyberattacks adopts the same general principles as HIPAA—
confidentiality, integrity, and availability
286—suggesting that the two 
agencies may be able to find common ground.  If Congress were to 
expand HIPAA or otherwise revisit the regulation of medical devices 
and hospital networks to protect against cyberattacks, it might 
consider whether one agency should take the lead in this area. 
Expanding HIPAA would incentivize medical device 
manufacturers and hospitals to protect against cyberattacks.  As 
described in Part II, the standard of care for cybersecurity is relatively 
unclear.  Until courts have the opportunity to grapple with several 
cases involving cyberattacks, it is unlikely that courts will have the 
opportunity to flesh out a standard of care that will incentivize 
medical device manufacturers and hospitals to take additional 
cybersecurity precautions.  In the interim, Congress could expand 
HIPAA to impose fines on medical device manufacturers and 
healthcare providers if a cyberattack occurs.  This is one way to 
incentivize rapid and flexible response by industry even where the 
standard of care is unclear.  This type of regulatory approach is 
consistent with that of the Obama administration, which has focused 
on setting “performance objectives, rather than specifying the 
behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must 
adopt.”287 
Under HIPAA, there are four tiers of culpability if a patient data 
breach occurs.  The defendant’s level of culpability determines the 
amount of damages.  As described in Part II, the first tier covers 
violations where “the person did not know (and by exercising 
reasonable diligence would not have known) that such person violated 
such provision,” with a minimum penalty of $100 per violation and an 
annual maximum penalty of $25,000 for repeat violations.
288
  The 
second tier covers violations where “the violation was due to 
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect” with a minimum penalty 
of $1,000 per violation and an annual maximum penalty of $100,000 
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for repeat violations.
289
  The third tier covers violations “due to willful 
neglect” that are corrected within a certain period of time, with a 
minimum penalty of $10,000 per violation and an annual maximum 
penalty of $250,000 for repeat violations.
290
  The fourth and final tier 
covers violations that are “due to willful neglect” but are not 
corrected in a timely manner, with a minimum penalty of $50,000 per 
violation and an annual maximum penalty of $1.5 million.
291
 
Congress could use this sliding scale approach to incentivize 
medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers to adopt 
cybersecurity measures.
292
  A sliding scale approach provides at least 
two benefits over a fine-grained regulatory approach.  First, it forces 
medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers to forecast 
future threats rather than to rely on FDA or HHS standards that—due 
to the length and difficulty of the regulatory process—may only 
address current (or even past) threats.  This approach incentivizes 
industry to rapidly adapt to changing threats or face liability.  Second, 
a sliding scale approach to damages allows industry to develop the 
most cost-effective approach.  While a particular regulatory standard 
may make sense when promulgated, it may not make sense even a 
few months later in the rapidly changing world of software.  Forcing 
industry to adopt an obsolete standard may be costly and 
counterproductive. 
Congress or the FDA would have to carefully define the types of 
violations that trigger liability for device manufacturers and hospitals.  
If every non-negligent software vulnerability led to a fine, the statute 
could over-incentivize investment in cybersecurity.  It may make 
sense to apply the tier one through tier three penalties only in the case 
of a cyberattack that leads to large-scale disruption of a network or 
physical harm to a patient.  Tier four penalties for willful neglect 
could apply to security flaws that are serious but remain uncorrected.  
The statute or accompanying regulations would have to define what 
constitutes a serious security flaw. 
Congress would also have to carefully consider which entities 
would face penalties under this scheme.  Medical device 
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manufacturers have greater insight into the security flaws of their 
individual medical devices, whereas large healthcare providers such 
as hospitals have control over the security features of their networks.  
The security of individual devices and hospital networks both play an 
important role in cybersecurity, although applying the same penalty 
scheme to both types of entities may create different incentives for 
medical device manufacturers and hospitals.  A security flaw in a 
medical device may result in a large number of violations for a single 
medical device manufacturer.  Consequently, the “per violation” 
penalties may be too high—or conversely, the maximum annual 
penalties may be too low—to ensure the optimal amount of 
deterrence. 
The same penalty scheme could affect healthcare providers 
differently.  Penalizing hospitals with thin profit margins may be 
counterproductive in some cases, making it more difficult for the 
hospital to invest in security or other important aspects of patient care.  
Different types of healthcare providers have vastly different resources 
and use different types of devices and networks.  Focusing on large 
providers such as hospitals may be sufficient to protect against 
cyberattacks as long as incentives for medical device manufacturers 
provide an extra layer of security for devices and networks used by 
small providers.  Ultimately, calibrating the penalties may be difficult 
and would require research into the best way to incentivize industry 
without unduly increasing costs or sacrificing patient care. 
While Congress has important details to work out before 
expanding HIPAA to addresses cyberattacks against both medical 
device manufacturers and healthcare providers, this approach could 
help protect against cyberattacks while leaving it up to industry to 
adopt the most cost-effective solution.  Although it is unlikely that 
medical device manufacturers or hospitals would support an expanded 
HIPAA scheme, this approach could ultimately save manufacturers 
and hospitals compliance costs by reducing overlapping HHS and 
FDA regulation. 
D. Other Approaches 
 There are other potential approaches to addressing the threat of 
cyberattacks on medical devices and hospital networks.  One solution 
is to promote investment in technology to identify the malicious 
actors behind cyberattacks, improving the deterrent power of laws 
that impose liability on these actors.  Tax credits for medical device 
manufacturers and hospitals that invest in cybersecurity measures are 
another approach.  Negligence liability under the CFAA would also 
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create incentives for medical device manufacturers and hospitals, 
although the imposition of criminal liability for negligence is harsh.  
Other approaches may become viable in the future.  As courts begin 
to grapple with some of the questions posed by negligence liability in 
the context of cyberattacks, courts may develop a common law 
framework that renders a statutory approach unnecessary.  However, 
given the emerging nature of the threats described in this Article, 
waiting for the common law to catch up may waste valuable time that 
could be spent improving cybersecurity. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress, regulators, healthcare providers, and medical device 
manufacturers should address the growing threat of cyberattacks 
against medical devices and hospital networks.  The current legal 
structure is insufficient to protect patients because it does not 
adequately deter the malicious actors behind cyberattacks and because 
it does not focus on the role of healthcare providers and medical 
device manufacturers in protecting against these attacks.  One 
solution is industry self-regulation, which has been successful in 
addressing other types of challenges in the healthcare industry.  
Another solution is to create a more forward-looking FDA regulatory 
structure geared towards anticipating and preventing cyberattacks.  A 
third option is to build on existing laws such as HIPAA to create a 
new legislative structure that incentivizes industry to invest in 
cybersecurity.  As recent cyberattacks on military computers and 
financial institutions suggest, cyberattacks are a serious threat.  It is 
only a matter of time before a malicious actor attacks a medical 
device or hospital network and harms patients.  While networked 
hospitals and wireless medical devices bring new advances in patient 
care, they also bring new risks.  New approaches are needed to 
address these risks.  
 
 
 
